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Abstract—Multi-task learning (MTL) refers to the paradigm of learning multiple related tasks together. In contrast, in single-task
learning (STL) each individual task is learned independently. MTL often leads to better trained models because they can leverage the
commonalities among related tasks. However, because MTL algorithms can “leak” information from different models across different
tasks, MTL poses a potential security risk. Specifically, an adversary may participate in the MTL process through one task and thereby
acquire the model information for another task. The previously proposed privacy-preserving MTL methods protect data instances rather
than models, and some of them may underperform in comparison with STL methods. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving
MTL framework to prevent information from each model leaking to other models based on a perturbation of the covariance matrix of the
model matrix. We study two popular MTL approaches for instantiation, namely, learning the low-rank and group-sparse patterns of the
model matrix. Our algorithms can be guaranteed not to underperform compared with STL methods. We build our methods based upon
tools for differential privacy, and privacy guarantees, utility bounds are provided, and heterogeneous privacy budgets are considered.
The experiments demonstrate that our algorithms outperform the baseline methods constructed by existing privacy-preserving MTL
methods on the proposed model-protection problem.
Index Terms—Multi-Task Learning, Model Protection, Differential Privacy, Covariance Matrix, Low-rank Subspace Learning.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MULTI-TASK LEARNING (MTL) [13] refers to theparadigm of learning multiple related tasks together.
In contrast, single-task learning (STL) refers to the paradigm
of learning each individual task independently. MTL often
leads to better trained models because the commonalities
among related tasks may assist in the learning process for
each specific task. For example, an infant’s ability to recog-
nize a cat might help in developing the ability to recognize a
dog. In recent years, MTL has received considerable interest
in a broad range of application areas, including computer
vision [48, 75], natural language processing [2] and health
informatics [64, 68]. The key to MTL is to relate learning
tasks via a shared representation, which, in turn, benefits
the tasks to be learned. Each possible shared representation
encodes certain assumptions regarding task relatedness.
Because MTL approaches explore and leverage the com-
monalities among related tasks within the learning process,
either explicitly or implicitly, they pose a potential security
risk. Specifically, an adversary may participate in the MTL
process through a participating task, thereby acquiring the
model information for another task. A predictive model may
identify a causality between system inputs and outputs.
Knowledge of the causality makes it possible or easier for an
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adversary to change a system input to trigger an irrational
or even harmful output, which can be regarded as a gen-
eralized adversarial attack. The system could be a predictive
system for traffic-sign recognition or face identification, as
studied by recent adversarial-attack approaches [65, 51, 46,
72, 57, 56, 52]. Pointed out by Finlayson et al. [27], adver-
sarial attacks on medical machine learning are increasingly
rampant and easy to implement (e.g., by simply rotating a
picture to upload to a specific angle), especially on medical
fraud which is a $250 billion industry. Therefore, model-
information leakage during an MTL process could realize
or escalate such adversarial attacks to increase irrational
medical costs or insurances. In addition, the aforementioned
system could well be a real human body. For example,
consider personalized predictive modeling [53, 74], which has
become a fundamental methodology in health informatics.
This type of modeling builds a custom-made model for
each patient. In modern health informatics, such a model
may include patient disease conditions/causes (e.g., which
foods can induce an allergic reaction in a patient). If such
information were to be leaked, an adversary might use
the information to deliberately introduce the food into a
patient meal to trigger an allergic reaction, which could be
disastrous.
Because of the concerns discussed above, a secure train-
ing strategy must be developed for MTL approaches to
prevent information from each model leaking to other mod-
els. In this paper, we propose a model-protected multi-task
learning (MP-MTL) approach that enables the joint learning
of multiple related tasks while simultaneously preventing
model leakage for each task. We use tools of differential
privacy [23] which provides a strong, cryptographically mo-
tivated definition of privacy based on rigorous mathemat-
ical theory and has recently received significant research
attention due to their robustness to known attacks [17, 28].
This scheme is useful when one wishes to prevent potential
attackers from acquiring information on any element of the
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Figure 1. Model-protected multi-task learning framework. The solution
process is a recursive two-step procedure. The first step is a decoupled
learning procedure in which the model parameters for each task are
estimated independently using the precomputed shared information
among tasks. The second step is a centralized transfer procedure in
which the information shared among tasks is extracted for distribution
to each task for the decoupled learning procedure in the next step. The
shared information is extracted from the tasks’ covariance matrix, into
which Wishart noise is introduced to ensure model security.
input dataset based on a change in the output distribution.
To focus on the main issue, our MP-MTL method is
designed simply based on linear multi-task models [39, 49].
We assume that the model parameters are learned by min-
imizing an objective that combines an average empirical
prediction loss and a regularization term. The regularization
term captures the commonalities among the different tasks
and couples their model parameters. The solution process
for this type of MTL method can be viewed as a recursive
two-step procedure. The first step is a decoupled learning
procedure in which the model parameters of each task are
estimated independently using some precomputed shared
information among tasks. The second step is a centralized
transfer procedure in which some of the information shared
among tasks is extracted for distribution to each task for
the decoupled learning procedure in the next step. Our MP-
MTL mechanism protects the models by adding perturba-
tions during the second step. Note that we assume a curator
that collects models for joint learning but never needs to
collect task data. We develop a rigorous mathematical defi-
nition of the MP-MTL problem and propose an algorithmic
framework to obtain the solution. We add perturbations to
the covariance matrix of the parameter matrix because the
tasks’ covariance matrix is widely used as a fundamental
source from which to extract useful knowledge to share
among tasks [49, 77, 39, 6, 79, 64], which is the key observa-
tion that enables the proposed framework. The usage of the
perturbed covariance matrix depends on the specific MTL
method applied. Consequently, our technique can cover a
wide range of MTL algorithms and is generally applicable
for many optimization schemes, such as proximal gradient
methods [39, 49], alternating methods [6] and Frank-Wolfe
methods [37]. We introduce Wishart noise into the covari-
ance matrix to ensure model security. Fig. 1 illustrates the
key ideas of the main framework.
We further develop two concrete approaches as instan-
tiations of our framework, each of which transforms an
existing MTL algorithm into a private version. Specifically,
we consider two popular types of basic MTL models: 1)
a model that learns a low-rank subspace by means of a
trace norm penalty [39] and 2) a model that performs
shared feature selection by means of a group-`1 (`2,1 norm)
penalty [49]. We first choose to learn a low-rank subspace
of the model matrix because it is typical to learn a shared
representation, which is the key to relate tasks in MTL. In
addition, it is also typical to learn correlated but different
parameters for multiple models that share the same model
structure, which is also commonly-encountered in MTL. In
fact, it is a typical/mainstream approach in MTL, as stated
by Zhang and Yang [76] in their MTL survey as well as
by Su et al. [63] and Gu et al. [32]; (see, e.g., Ando and
Zhang [4], Chen et al. [18], Xu and Lafferty [71], Han
and Zhang [35], and Zhen et al. [78]). On the other hand,
learning a shared feature selection is also typical in MTL
and can be regarded as learning a specific type of low-rank
subspace. In both cases, we instantiate our framework by
approximating proximal gradient descent methods, which were
presented by Ji and Ye [39] and Liu et al. [49]. The covariance
matrix is used to build a linear transform matrix used to
project the models into new feature subspaces; then, the
most useful subspaces are selected. The projection matrix
is related to the generalized inverse of the singular value
matrix (or the diagonal matrix) of the perturbed covariance
matrix for the instantiation with a trace norm penalty (or
the instantiation with a group-`1 penalty). Wishart noise
is positive definite; thus, it renders the singular values of
the perturbed covariance matrix “larger” and those of the
generalized inverse “smaller”. Consequently, under a high
noise level, the projection matrix tends to be an identity
matrix that shares no information between models but keeps
the models intact. This means that our algorithms will not
underperform in comparison with STL methods under high
noise levels; hence, participation in the joint learning process
has no negative effect on training any task model. Approx-
imating the proximal operators with Wishart noise makes
it possible for the added noise to destroy the covariance
matrix without destroying the projected models, which is
a key observation that enables the proposed instantiated
algorithms.
We provide privacy guarantees. Utility analyses are
also presented for both convex and strongly convex pre-
diction loss functions and for both the basic and acceler-
ated proximal-gradient methods. Furthermore, we consider
heterogeneous privacy budgets for different iterations of
our algorithms and present a utility analysis for privacy-
budget allocation. We also validate the effectiveness of our
approach on both benchmark and real-world datasets.
Our proposed MP-MTL algorithms fall into a larger
scope of differentially private MTL algorithms (i.e., MTL al-
gorithms with randomness added using differential privacy
tools). Within this scope, to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to present a utility analysis for heterogeneous
tasks. In contrast, the distributed tasks studied by Pathak
et al. [58] are homogeneous (i.e., the coding procedures for
both features and targets are the same for different tasks).
To our knowledge, we are also the first to provide privacy
guarantees for heterogeneous tasks and for loss functions
without closed-form solutions (e.g., logistic loss).
Since our method are the first to address the model-
protected problem in MTL setting, we construct baseline
MP-MTL methods for comparison by exploiting existing
privacy-preserving MTL methods, which are referred to as
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instance-protected multi-task learning (IP-MTL) methods
because they protect the security only of data instances
rather than that of models. The IP-MTL methods are trans-
formed into their respective MP-MTL methods by directly
enforcing the group privacy [23] of the entire dataset com-
ing from a single learning task. The experimental results
demonstrate that our proposed algorithms outperform the
constructed baseline MP-MTL methods.
The contributions of this paper are highlighted as fol-
lows.
• We are the first to propose and address the model-
protection problem in an MTL setting.
• We develop a general algorithmic framework to
solve the MP-MTL problem to obtain secure esti-
mates of the model parameters. We derive concrete
instantiations of our algorithmic framework for two
popular types of MTL models, namely, models that
learn the low-rank and group-sparse patterns of the
model matrix. By approximating the proximal op-
erators with Wishart noise, we can guarantee that
our algorithms will not underperform in comparison
with STL methods under high noise levels.
• We provide privacy guarantees. We also present
utility analyses for both convex and strongly con-
vex prediction loss functions and for both the basic
and accelerated proximal-gradient methods. Hetero-
geneous privacy budgets are considered for different
iterations of our algorithms, and a utility analysis for
privacy-budget allocation is presented.
• Within the larger scope of differentially private MTL
algorithms, to the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to provide privacy guarantees for heteroge-
neous tasks and for loss functions without closed-
form solutions. We are also the first to present utility
analyses for heterogeneous tasks and the first to
present allocation strategies for heterogeneous pri-
vacy budgets.
• For comparison, we construct baseline MP-MTL
methods using IP-MTL methods (i.e., existing
privacy-preserving MTL methods). The experiments
demonstrate that our proposed algorithms signifi-
cantly outperform the baseline methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses related works and definitions of dif-
ferential privacy. Section 3 introduces the background on
MTL problems and the definition of the proposed model-
protection problem. The algorithmic framework and con-
crete instantiations of the proposed MP-MTL method are
presented in Section 4, along with the analyses of utility
and privacy-budget allocation. Section 5 presents an empir-
ical evaluation of the proposed approaches, and Section 6
provides conclusions.
2 RELATED WORKS
2.1 Privacy-preserving MTL Approaches
Few privacy-preserving MTL approaches have been pro-
posed to date [50, 10, 58, 61, 34]. Moreover, such approaches
protect only the security of data instances rather than that
of models. A typical focus of research is distributed learn-
ing [50, 10], in which the datasets for different tasks are
distributively located. The local task models are trained
independently using their own datasets before being ag-
gregated and injected with useful knowledge shared across
tasks. Such a procedure mitigates the privacy problem by
updating each local model independently. However, these
methods do not provide theoretical privacy guarantees.
Pathak et al. [58] proposed a differentially private aggre-
gation (DP-AGGR) method in a distributed learning scheme
with privacy guarantees in which they first trained local
models distributively and then averaged the models of the
tasks before adding noise based on the output perturbation
method of [21]. The final solution for each task is the aver-
aged model. However, because this method performs only
averaging, it has a limited ability to address more compli-
cated task relations such as low-rank [4], group-sparse [66],
clustered [31] or graph-based [77] task structures.
Gupta et al. [34] proposed a differentially private multi-
task relationship learning (DP-MTRL) method to transform
the multi-task relationship learning proposed by Zhang and
Yeung [77] into a differentially private version. They adopts
the output perturbation method. However, their method
requires a closed-form solution (obtained by minimizing the
least-square loss function) to achieve a theoretical privacy
guarantee; thus, it cannot guarantee privacy for methods
such as logistic regression, which requires iterative op-
timization procedures. Moreover, their privacy-preserving
MTL methods underperformed on their synthetic datasets
compared with non-private STL methods (which can guar-
antee optimal privacy against cross-task information leak-
age), which suggests that there is no reason to use their
proposed methods. In addition, they did not study the
additional privacy leakage that occurs due to the iterative
nature of their algorithm (see Kairouz et al. [42]), and they
did not study the utility bound for their method.
The approaches of both Pathak et al. [58] and Gupta
et al. [34] protect a single data instance instead of the
model of each task, and they involve adding noise directly
to the models, which is unnecessary to avoid information
leakage across tasks—and may jeopardize the utility of the
algorithms.
2.2 Related Works of Differential Privacy
Several related definitions of privacy are listed as follows.
Joint differential privacy. In a game theory setting, Kearns
et al. [45] and Kearns et al. [44] proposed to guarantee that
for each player, the output to other players reveals little
input information about that player. Except for the details
of game theory, such as player type, this definition can be
regarded as identical to the privacy constraint used in our
proposed MP-MTL algorithms.
One-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy. In a database query
setting, Hsu et al. [36] proposed a method for protecting
the privacy of all the queries of one analyst from other
analysts. They also proposed a related privacy called one-
query-to-many-analyst privacy. Both privacy definitions can
be regarded as identical to the privacy constraints used in
our proposed MP-MTL and our defined IP-MTL algorithms,
respectively, except for the details of database query.
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Roughly speaking, the above approaches and this paper
adopt the same privacy constraints but work in different
specific fields. This paper leverages these concepts to pro-
pose a method to handle the model-protection problem in
an MTL setting.
Differential privacy for streams. This definition considers
continual/iterative observations, and was proposed by
Chan et al. [14] and Dwork et al. [22]. Because machine
learning algorithms are generally iterative, this paper also
involves the concept of iteration in the definitions of MP-
MTL and IP-MTL algorithms, and it simply aims to directly
use composition theorems of differential privacy to bound
the total privacy-budgets.
Local private learning algorithms. This definition was pro-
posed by Kasiviswanathan et al. [43] to characterize that
each individual’s data are added independent randomness
before further processing. Algorithms that accomplish this
task are referred to as input perturbation. The idea can be
adopted to propose possible solutions to the MP-MTL prob-
lem. For example, independent randomness can be added
to each task model. Both DP-MTRL and DP-AGGR can be
regarded as examples, although they protect data instances
rather than models. However, because local private learning
algorithms have some limitations (e.g., they may require
exponentially more data than do general private algorithms
[43]), we did not adopt this idea when constructing our MP-
MTL method.
Secure multi-party computation (SMC). In Section 1, we as-
sume the use of a trusted curator that collects the task
models, and this assumption raises privacy concerns in
untrusted curator settings. Such concerns are related to
the demand for SMC [58, 29], the purpose of which is
to avoid the leakage of data instances to the curator. We
present an extended framework that considers SMC in the
supplementary material.
In addition to the above related definitions, the sample-
aggregate framework proposed by Nissim et al. [55] is also
related. This framework first randomly partitions a database
into multiple small databases, executes the same algorithms
on all the sub-databases, aggregates all the outputs, and
finally adds randomness according to the smooth sensi-
tivity of the aggregation function. For model-protection,
this framework may be applicable for homogeneous tasks
(which is the setting considered by DP-AGGR) to extend
their method for empirical risk minimization: instead of
data instances, tasks can be randomly partitioned into
groups to perform the above procedures. However, apply-
ing this framework to heterogeneous tasks is not trivial. The
framework may also be applied to improve the utility of
DP-AGGR by smooth sensitivity.
2.3 Methods that Privately Release the Covariance Ma-
trix
Several methods have been proposed to privately release
the covariance matrix [41, 24, 11]. Considering an additive
noise matrix, based on our utility analysis, the overall utility
of the MTL algorithm depends on the spectral norm of the
noise matrix. A list of the bounds on the spectral norms of
additive noise matrices can be found in Jiang et al. [41]. We
choose to add Wishart noise [41] to the covariance matrix
for four reasons: (1) For a given privacy budget, this type of
noise matrix has a better spectral-norm bound than does
a Laplace noise matrix [41]. (2) Unlike a Gaussian noise
matrix, which enables an (, δ)-private method with a pos-
itive δ, this approach enables an (, 0)-private method and
can be used to build an iterative algorithm that is entirely
(, 0)-private, which provides a stronger privacy guarantee.
(3) Unlike the Gaussian and Laplace noise matrices cases,
the Wishart noise matrix is positive definite and can be ex-
ploited to guarantee that our method will not underperform
compared with STL methods under high noise levels. (4)
This approach allows arbitrary changes to any task, unlike
the method of Blocki et al. [11].
3 PRELIMINARIES AND THE PROPOSED PROBLEM
In this section, we first introduce the MTL background and
then introduce the definition of model-protection problems
for MTL.
The notations and symbols that will be used throughout
the paper are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Notations and Symbols
[k] the index set {1, 2, · · · , k}
[−i] the index set with index i removed
‖ · ‖∗ the trace norm of a matrix (sum of the singu-
lar values of the matrix)
‖ · ‖2,1 the `2,1 norm of a matrix (sum of the `2 norms
of the row vectors of the matrix)
tr(·) the trace of a matrix (sum of the diagonal
elements of the matrix)
σj(·) the j-th largest singular value of a matrix, j ∈
[m]
Extensive MTL studies have been conducted on linear
models using regularized approaches. The basic MTL algo-
rithm that we consider in this paper is as follows:
Ŵ = arg min
W
∑m
i=1
Li(Xiwi,yi) + λg(W), (1)
where m is the number of tasks. The datasets for
the tasks are denoted by Dm = (Xm,ym) =
{(X1,y1), . . . , (Xm,ym)}, where for each i ∈ [m], Di =
(Xi,yi), where Xi ∈ Rni×d and yi ∈ Rni×1 denote the data
matrix and target vector of the i-th task with ni samples
and dimensionality d, respectively. Li is the prediction loss
function for the i-th task. In this paper, we focus on linear
MTL models in which wi denotes the model/predictor
for task i and W = [w1,w2, · · · ,wm] ∈ Rd×m is the
model parameter matrix. g(·) is a regularization term that
represents the structure of the information shared among
the tasks, for which λ is a pre-fixed hyper-parameter. As a
special case, STL can be described by (1) with λ = 0.
The key to MTL is to relate the tasks via a shared
representation, which, in turn, benefits the tasks to be
learned. Each possible shared representation encodes certain
assumptions regarding task relatedness.
A typical/mainstream assumption is that the tasks share
a latent low-rank subspace, as stated by Zhang and Yang
[76] in their survey on MTL, and also by Su et al. [63] and
Gu et al. [32]; see, e.g., Ando and Zhang [4], Chen et al.
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[18], Xu and Lafferty [71], Han and Zhang [35], and Zhen
et al. [78]. The formulation leads to a low-rank structure of
the model matrix. Because optimization problems involving
rank functions are intractable, a trace-norm penalty is typ-
ically used [3, 39, 59], as in the following problem, which
will be referred to as the trace-norm-regularized MTL problem.
min
W
∑m
i=1
Li(Xiwi,yi) + λ‖W‖∗. (2)
Another typical assumption is that all tasks share a
subset of important features. Such task relatedness can be
captured by imposing a group-sparse penalty on the predic-
tor matrix to select shared features across tasks [66, 70, 49].
One commonly used group-sparse penalty is the group `1
penalty [49, 54], as in the following problem, which will be
referred to as the group-`1-regularized MTL problem.
min
W
∑m
i=1
Li(Xiwi,yi) + λ‖W‖2,1. (3)
Next, we present a compact definition of the model-
protection problem in the context of MTL and discuss the
general approach without differential privacy. As (1) shows,
as a result of the joint learning process, ŵj may contain
some information on ŵi, for i, j ∈ [m] and i 6= j, making it
possible for the owner of task j to use such information to
attack task i. Thus, we define the model-protection problem
as follows.
Definition 1 (Model-protection Problem for MTL). The
model-protection problem for MTL has three objectives:
1) to minimize the information on ŵi that can be inferred from
ŵ[−i], for all i ∈ [m];
2) to maximize the prediction performance of ŵi, for all i ∈
[m]; and
3) to share useful predictive information among tasks.
Now, consider such a procedure in which a trusted
curator collects independently-trained models, denoted by
w1, . . . ,wm, for all tasks without their associated data to be
used as input. After the joint learning process, the curator
outputs the updated models, denoted by Ŵ, and sends each
updated model to each task privately. The model collection
and joint learning processes are performed alternately.
We note that the trace-norm-regularized MTL problem and
the group-`1-regularized MTL problem are unified in the multi-
task feature learning framework, which is based on the
covariance matrix of the tasks’ predictors [7, 25, 8]. Many
other MTL methods also fall under this framework, such
as learning clustered structures among tasks [31, 79] and
inferring task relations [77, 26, 12]. As such, we note that
the tasks’ covariance matrix constitutes a major source of
shared knowledge in MTL methods; hence, it is regarded as
the primary target for model protection.
Therefore, we address the model-protection problem by
rephrasing the first objective in Definition 1 as follows: to
minimize the changes in ŵ[−i] and the tasks’ covariance
matrix (ŴŴT or ŴTŴ) when task i participates in the
joint learning process for all i ∈ [m]. Thus, the model for
this new task is protected.
Then, we find that the concept of differential privacy
(minimizing the change in the output distribution) can be
adopted to further rephrase this objective as follows: to
minimize the changes in the distribution of ŵ[−i] and the
tasks’ covariance matrix when task i participates in the joint
learning process for all i ∈ [m].
In differential privacy, algorithms are randomized by
introducing some type of perturbation.
Definition 2 (Randomized Algorithm). A randomized algo-
rithm A : D → θ ∈ C is built by introducing some type
of perturbation into some mapping D → θ ∈ C. Algorithm
A outputs A(D) = θ with a density p(A(D) = θ) for each
θ ∈ C. The probability space is over the perturbation introduced
into algorithm A.
In this paper, A denotes some randomized machine
learning estimator, and θ denotes the model parameters that
we wish to estimate. Perturbations can be introduced into
the original learning system via the (1) input data [47, 9], (2)
model parameters [15, 40], (3) objective function [16, 73], or
(4) optimization process [62, 69].
The formal definition of differential privacy is as follows.
Definition 3 (Dwork et al. [23]). A randomized algorithm A
provides (, δ)-differential privacy if, for any two adjacent datasets
D and D′ that differ by a single entry and for any set S ,
P(A(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp()P(A(D′) ∈ S) + δ,
where A(D) and A(D′) are the outputs of A on the inputs D
and D′, respectively.
The privacy loss pair (, δ) is referred to as the privacy
budget/loss, and it quantifies the privacy risk of algorithm
A. The intuition is that it is difficult for a potential attacker
to infer whether a certain data point has been changed in
(or added to) the dataset D based on a change in the output
distribution. Consequently, the information of any single
data point is protected.
Furthermore, note that differential privacy is defined in
terms of application-specific adjacent input databases. In
our setting, these are each task’s model and dataset pair,
which are treated as a “single entry” by Definition 3.
Several mechanisms exist for introducing a specific type
of perturbation. A typical type is calibrated to the sensitivity
of the original “unrandomized” machine learning estimator
f : D → θ ∈ Rd. The sensitivity of an estimator is defined
as the maximum change in its output due to a replacement
of any single data instance.
Definition 4 (Dwork et al. [23]). The sensitivity of a function
f : D → Rd is defined as
S(f) = max
D,D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖
for all datasetsD andD′ that differ by at most one instance, where
‖ · ‖ is specified by a particular mechanism. For example, the
Gaussian mechanism [24] requires the `2 norm, and the Laplace
mechanism [23] requires the `1 norm.
The use of additive noise such as Laplace [23] or
Gaussian noise [24] with a standard deviation proportional
to S(f) is a common practice for guaranteeing private learn-
ing. In this paper, we adopt the Wishart noise for covariance
matrices [41], which is defined as follows.
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Definition 5 (Gupta and Nagar [33]). A d × d random
symmetric positive definite matrix E is said to have a Wishart
distribution E ∼Wd(ν,V) if its probability density function is
p(E) =
|E|(ν−d−1)/2 exp(−tr(V−1E)/2)
2
νd
2 |V|1/2Γd(ν/2)
,
where ν > d− 1 and V is a d× d positive definite matrix.
Because machine learning schemes are usually presented
as sequential paradigms with multiple iterations and usu-
ally output multiple variables simultaneously, several differ-
ential privacy properties are particularly useful for ensuring
privacy in machine learning, such as post-processing im-
munity, group privacy, composition properties and adaptive
composition. The details of these properties are introduced
in the supplementary material.
4 METHODOLOGY
We present our methodology in this section: the modeling
of and rationale for our MP-MTL framework, two instantia-
tions and utility analyses. Regarding the theoretical results,
we present only the main results; the detailed derivations
are included in the provided supplementary material.
4.1 The General MP-MTL Framework
Consider an MTL algorithm A with T iterations. For t =
1, . . . , T , a trusted curator collects the models of m tasks,
respectively, denoted by w(t−1)1 , . . . ,w
(t−1)
m . Then, a model-
protection and shared-information-extraction procedure is
performed, and the updated models wˆ(t)1 , . . . , wˆ
(t)
m are out-
put and sent back to their respective tasks.
Remark 1. Note that in each iteration, the curator collects only
the models. The dataset for each task can be regarded as the input
for the entire MTL algorithm, but it is not the input for the
curator.
In such a setting, for each i ∈ [m], we wish to protect
the dataset Di = (Xi,yi) of task i and its entire input
model-sequence (w(0)i , ...,w
(T−1)
i ) (denoted by w
(0:T−1)
i for
short). For the i-th task, the entire output model-sequence of
other tasks, wˆ(1:T )[−i] , is the view of a potential adversary
(i.e., the information that the adversary can acquire to infer
the unique information of task i). Note that although the
output model-sequence of each task is what we ultimately
wish to protect, the unique information within each task is
contained in the task’s dataset and input model-sequence,
which are actually protected.
The idea for using differental privacy tools is as follows.
For simpilicity, we assume that T = 1 and omit the iteration-
step indices. Let D˜ = {(w1,D1), . . . , (wm,Dm)} be an
augmented dataset; i.e., let (wi,Di) be treated as the i-th
“data instance” of the augmented dataset D˜, for all i ∈ [m].
Thus, the m datasets and m models associated with the m
tasks are transformed into a single dataset D˜ with m “data
instances”. Then, we define m outputs θ = (θ1, . . . , θm)
such that for each i ∈ [m], θi ∈ Ci denotes the view of an
adversary for task i, which includes wˆ[−i]. Thus, an (, δ)
- MP-MTL algorithm A(B) should satisfy the following m
inequalities. For each i ∈ [m], for all neighboring datasets D˜
and D˜′ that differ by the i-th “data instance”, and for any
set Si ⊆ Ci, we have
P(θi ∈ Si | B = D˜) ≤ eP(θi ∈ Si | B = D˜′) + δ. (4)
We formally define an MP-MTL algorithm as follows.
Definition 6 (MP-MTL). LetA be a randomized MTL algorithm
with a number of iterations T . In the first iteration, A performs
the mapping (W(0) ∈ Rd×m,Dm) → θ1 ∈ C1, where θ1 in-
cludes Ŵ(1) ∈ Rd×m. For t = 2, . . . , T , in the t-th iteration, A
performs the mapping (W(t−1) ∈ Rd×m,Dm, θ1, . . . , θt−1) →
θt ∈ Ct, where θt includes Ŵ(t) ∈ Rd×m. Then, A is an (, δ)
- MP-MTL algorithm if for all i ∈ [m], for all t ∈ [T ], and for
neighboring input pairs (W(t−1),Dm) and ((W′)(t−1), (D′)m)
that differ only by the i-th task such that w(t−1)i 6= (w′i)(t−1) or
Di 6= D′i, the following holds for some constants , δ ≥ 0 and for
any set S ⊆ Rd×(m−1)×T :
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1),Dm,θ1:t−1))
≤eP(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = ((W′)(t−1), (D′)m,θ1:t−1))
+ δ,
(5)
where for all t ∈ [T ], Bt denotes the input for the t-th iteration
and
θ1:t−1 =
{ ∅, t = 1
θ1, θ2, · · · , θt−1, t ≥ 2.
Note that in Definition 6, we view the model sequence
wˆ
(1:T )
[−i] as a single output of the algorithm for each task
i ∈ [m]. The definition of neighboring inputs allows the
model and dataset for any task to change in all rounds
of the iterative optimization rather than in only a single
round. Definition 6 defines a privacy constraint for MTL
algorithms. Roughly speaking, this privacy constraint can be
regarded as identical to joint differential privacy [45, 44] or to
one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy [36], despite detailed dif-
ferences between MTL, game theory, and database queries.
STL can easily be shown to be optimal for avoiding
information leakage across tasks because the individual task
models are learned independently.
Claim 1. Any STL algorithm that learns each task independently
is a (0, 0) - MP-MTL algorithm.
From this claim, we learn that when no information
sharing occurs across tasks, no leakage can occur across
tasks.
Our MP-MTL framework is elaborated in Algorithm 1,
which considers heterogeneous privacy budgets for differ-
ent iteration steps. To maintain the total privacy budget
below than a specified value using the adaptive composi-
tion theorem provided by Kairouz et al. [42], we define a
composition bound of a series of privacy budgets as follows
(the equation is taken directly from Theorem 3.5 of Kairouz
et al. [42]):
Definition 7 (Composition Bound of Privacy Budgets). For
an integer T ≥ 1, a series of privacy budgets, 1, . . . , T ≥ 0,
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a specified privacy loss δ ≥ 0, the composition bound of {t} is
defined as CB({t}, δ), which equals
min
{ T∑
t=1
t,
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
1
δ
)
,
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
t
δ
)}
.
(6)
In Algorithm 1, as mentioned in Section 3, we choose
to protect the tasks’ covariance matrix, which is denoted
by Σ = WWT or Σ = WTW, depending on the MTL
method selected. As previously stated, Wishart noise [41] is
added. Fig. 1 illustrates the key concepts of the framework.
In detail, Step 1 of Algorithm 1 ensures that the total privacy
budgets satisfy the specified values  and δ, respectively.
The purpose of norm clipping in Step 3 is simply to render
the models in a bounded space, which help us compute a
proper noise scale to add to satisfy the privacy constraint de-
fined in Definition 6. Step 4 extracts the shared information
between tasks—the tasks’ covariance matrix. Step 5 adds
a perturbation into the shared information. Step 6 further
extracts useful information from the perturbed covariance
matrix. Step 7 sends the extracted useful information to
each task to perform decoupled learning. If no noise is
added, Steps 4–7 could be a proximal gradient descent
step, i.e., first performing a proximal operator step and
then taking a gradient descent step; see, e.g., Ji and Ye [39]
and Liu et al. [49]. This framework is generally applicable
for many optimization schemes, such as proximal gradient
methods [39, 49], alternating methods [6] and Frank-Wolfe
methods [37].
Note that we mainly provided theoretical and experi-
mental results for the WWT type of covariance matrix.
Nonetheless, the WTW type of covariance matrix can be
regarded as a natural alternative, since it was successfully
used by Zhang and Yeung [77] (as a non-private method),
Gupta et al. [34] (as a differentially private method), and all
the subsequent MTL methods to learn relationships between
tasks (see, e.g., the task-relation learning approaches intro-
duced by Zhang and Yang [76] in Section 2.4 of their survey
on MTL). Therefore, we included it in our framework.
Remark 2. In Algorithm 1, a curator who collects models and
performs centralized transfer needs to run only Steps 4–6 and
does not need to collect the datasets (Xm,ym), which are used
only in STL algorithms.
4.2 Instantiations of the MP-MTL Framework
In this section, we instantiate our MP-MTL framework
(described in Algorithm 1) by approximating the proximal
gradient descent methods presented by Ji and Ye [39] and Liu
et al. [49] for the trace-norm-regularized MTL problem and the
group-`1-regularized MTL problem, respectively. Both proxi-
mal gradient descent methods solve the respective MTL
problems by alternately performing a proximal operator
step and a gradient descent step. Taking the trace-norm-
regularized MTL problem as an example, the loss function,∑
i Li, is minimized by the gradient descent steps, while
the regularization term, the trace-norm, is minimized by
Algorithm 1 MP-MTL framework
Input: Datasets (Xm,ym) = {(X1,y1), . . . , (Xm,ym)}, where
∀i ∈ [m], Xi ∈ Rni×d and yi ∈ Rni×1. Privacy loss , δ ≥ 0.
Number of iterations T . Initial shared information matrix
M(0). Initial task models W(0), which can be acquired via
arbitrary STL methods.
Output: Ŵ(1:T ) .
1: Set {t} such that CB({t}, δ) ≤ , where CB({t}, δ) is
the composition bound of {t}.
2: for t = 1 : T do
3: Norm clipping: w˜(t−1)i = w
(t−1)
i /max(1,
‖w(t−1)i ‖2
K
), for
all i ∈ [m]. Let Ŵ(0) = W˜(0).
4: Σ˜
(t)
= W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T (or Σ˜
(t)
= (W˜(t−1))TW˜(t−1)).
5: Σ(t) = Σ˜
(t)
+ E, where E ∼ Wd(d + 1, K22t Id) (or
E ∼ Wm(m + 1, K22t Im)) is a sample from the Wishart
distribution, Id denotes the d × d identity matrix, and
diag(·) transforms a vector into a diagonal matrix.
6: Perform an arbitrary mapping f : Σ(1:t) → M(t), e.g.,
take the diagonal elements of Σ(t) or the singular value
decomposition of Σ(t).
7: wˆ(t)i = Ast,i(M(t), w˜(0:t−1)i ,Xi,yi), for all i ∈ [m], whereAst,i is an arbitrary STL algorithm for the i-th task and
the w˜(0:t−1)i are used for initialization.
8: Set the input for the next iteration: W(t) = Ŵ(t).
9: end for
the proximal operator steps. The proximal operator min-
imizes the regularization term, keeping the variable near
the result of a previous gradient descent step. Specifically,
we instantiate Steps 4–7 of Algorithm 1 by approximating
a proximal gradient descent step, i.e., first performing a
proximal operator step and then taking a gradient descent
step. It is similar for the group-`1-regularized MTL problem
but the difference lies in the instantiations of Step 6 of
Algorithm 1 because different regularization terms lead to
different optimal solutions for the proximal operators. Note
that both instantiations use the WWT type of covariance
matrix, which is required by the optimal solutions [39, 49].
First, we instantiate the MP-MTL framework for the
trace-norm-regularized MTL problem, as shown in Algorithm
2. Generally speaking, the algorithm uses an accelerated
proximal gradient method. Steps 4–9 approximate the fol-
lowing proximal operator [39]:
Ŵ(t−1) = arg min
W
1
2η
‖W − W˜(t−1)‖2F + λ‖W‖∗, (7)
where W˜(t−1) can be regarded as the result of the gra-
dient descent step in the previous iteration, assuming K
is sufficiently large. In detail, Steps 6–8 of Algorithm 2
instantiate Step 6 of Algorithm 1 by constructing a projection
matrix, M(t) = USηλUT, from the result of singular vector
decomposition of the perturbed covariance matrix. Steps
9–11 of Algorithm 2 instantiate Step 7 of Algorithm 1 by
first projecting the models (in Step 9) and then performing
accelerated gradient descent.
We provide a running example for model leakage and
model protection under different settings of Algorithm 2,
as shown in Fig. 2. We generate models for m = 10
tasks, in which the data dimension is d = 5. The 10th
task (the rightmost one), is an anomaly task that requires
privacy protection. In Fig. 2 (a), the matrix denoted by
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(a) Before MTL (b) After MTL with
model leakage
(c) After MTL with
model protection
Figure 2. Examples of model leakage and model protection showing
model matrices, where columns correspond to tasks and rows cor-
respond to features. The columns shown have been divided by their
respective `2 norms.
W(0) is first generated from an i.i.d. uniform distribution
U(0, 1). Then, the rightmost column is multiplied by 100.
For MTL with model leakage, we execute Algorithm 2,
setting T = 1, η = 1, 1 =  = 1e40, δ = 0,K = 100
√
5
and λ = 50. It can be regarded that the noise matrix E is not
added, since  1. The output model matrix Ŵ(1) is shown
in Fig. 2 (b), in which the 10th task results in significantly
influences on the parameters of other models: other models’
parameters are similar to those of the 10th task, e.g., for each
task, the first feature is the biggest, and the fifth feature is
the smallest. For MTL with model protection, we execute
Algorithm 2 with the same setting as above except that we
set 1 =  = 0.1. The output model matrix Ŵ(1) is shown in
Fig. 2 (c), in which the influences from the 10th task are not
significant: other models’ parameters are not similar to those
of the 10th task. Meanwhile, for W(0), shown in Fig. 2 (a),
for tasks 1-9, the `2 norms of the second and the fifth rows
are the two largest ones; these are clearly shown in Fig. 2 (c).
This result means the shared information between tasks is to
use the second and the fifth features, which is successfully
extracted by the MTL method with model protection.
Algorithm 2 MP-MTL Low-rank Estimator
Input: Datasets (Xm,ym) = {(X1,y1), . . . , (Xm,ym)}, where
∀i ∈ [m], Xi ∈ Rni×d and yi ∈ Rni×1. Privacy loss , δ ≥ 0.
Number of iterations T . Step size η. Regularization param-
eter λ > 0. Norm clipping parameter K > 0. Acceleration
parameters {βt}. Initial task models W(0).
Output: Ŵ(1:T ) .
1: Set {t} such that CB({t}, δ) ≤ , where CB({t}, δ) is
the composition bound of {t}.
2: for t = 1 : T do
3: Norm clipping: w˜(t−1)i = w
(t−1)
i /max(1,
‖w(t−1)i ‖2
K
), for
all i ∈ [m]. Let Ŵ(0) = W˜(0).
4: Σ˜
(t)
= W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T.
5: Σ(t) = Σ˜
(t)
+ E, where E ∼Wd(d+ 1, K22t Id) is a sample
from the Wishart distribution.
6: Perform singular vector decomposition: UΛUT = Σ(t).
7: Let Sηλ be a diagonal matrix, and let Sηλ,ii = max{0, 1−
ηλ/
√
Λii}, for i = 1, . . . ,min{d,m}.
8: M(t) = USηλUT.
9: Let wˆ(t)i = M
(t)w˜
(t−1)
i , for all i ∈ [m].
10: Let z(t)i = wˆ
(t)
i + βt(wˆ
(t)
i − wˆ(t−1)i ), for all i ∈ [m].
11: Let w(t)i = z
(t)
i − η ∂Li(Xiz
(t)
i ,yi)
∂z(t)i
, for all i ∈ [m].
12: end for
Second, we instantiate the MP-MTL framework for the
group-`1-regularized MTL problem defined in (3), as shown in
Algorithm 3. Steps 4–8 approximate the following proximal
operator [49]:
Ŵ(t−1) = arg min
W
1
2η
‖W − W˜(t−1)‖2F + λ‖W‖2,1. (8)
The only difference between Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 2
is the way they obtain the projection matrix M(t) for the
models (see the differences between Steps 6–8 of Algorithm
2 and Steps 6–7 of Algorithm 3). Because Algorithm 3
minimizes the group-sparse penalty, it focuses on only the
diagonal elements of the perturbed covariance matrix.
The error bounds for the proximal operator approxima-
tions are provided in Section 4.4.
Algorithm 3 MP-MTL Group-sparse Estimator
Input: Datasets (Xm,ym) = {(X1,y1), . . . , (Xm,ym)}, where
∀i ∈ [m], Xi ∈ Rni×d and yi ∈ Rni×1. Privacy loss , δ ≥ 0.
Number of iterations T . Step size η. Regularization param-
eter λ > 0. Norm clipping parameter K > 0. Acceleration
parameters {βt}. Initial task models W(0).
Output: Ŵ(1:T ) .
1: Set {t} such that CB({t}, δ) ≤ , where CB({t}, δ) is
the composition bound of {t}.
2: for t = 1 : T do
3: Norm clipping: w˜(t−1)i = w
(t−1)
i /max(1,
‖w(t−1)i ‖2
K
), for
all i ∈ [m]. Let Ŵ(0) = W˜(0).
4: Σ˜
(t)
= W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T.
5: Σ(t) = Σ˜
(t)
+ E, where E ∼Wd(d+ 1, K22t Id) is a sample
of the Wishart distribution.
6: Let Sηλ be a diagonal matrix, where for i = 1, . . . , d,
Sηλ,ii = max{0, 1− ηλ/
√
|Σ(t)ii |}.
7: M(t) = Sηλ.
8: Let wˆ(t)i = M
(t)w˜
(t−1)
i , for all i ∈ [m].
9: Let z(t)i = wˆ
(t)
i + βt(wˆ
(t)
i − wˆ(t−1)i ), for all i ∈ [m].
10: Let w(t)i = z
(t)
i − η ∂Li(Xiz
(t)
i ,yi)
∂z(t)i
, for all i ∈ [m].
11: end for
We use the following result to show that under high
noise levels, our algorithms share no information between
models but keep the models intact; thus, they degrade to
STL methods but in such a way they do not underperform
compared with STL methods.
Proposition 1. For Algorithm 2, the projection matrix USηλUT
degrades to an identity matrix, and the algorithm degrades to
an STL algorithm with no random perturbation if the smallest
singular value of E satisfies σd(E) = Cλ2 for a sufficiently large
C > 0.
For Algorithm 3, the projection matrix Sηλ degrades to an
identity matrix, and the algorithm degrades to an STL algorithm
with no random perturbation if the smallest diagonal element of
E satisfies minj Ejj = Cλ2 for sufficiently large C > 0.
We also consider other complex MTL frameworks for
instantiation. For example, Gong et al. [30], Chen et al.
[19], Jalali et al. [38] and Chen et al. [20] considered a
decomposed parameter/model matrix to handle hetero-
geneities among tasks, e.g., detecting entry-wise outliers
in the parameter matrix [38, 20] and detecting anomalous
tasks [30, 19]. These detection procedures are claimed to
be beneficial for the knowledge sharing process in cases of
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heterogeneous tasks. Our MP-MTL framework can be natu-
rally extended to such a model-decomposed setting because
the additional procedures are still STL algorithms; hence,
the privacy loss will not increase (see the supplementary
material for additional details).
4.3 Privacy Guarantees
The following two results show that our proposed frame-
work and the two instantiated algorithms satisfy the privacy
constraint defined in Definition 6.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 is an (, δ) - MP-MTL algorithm.
Corollary 1. Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 are (, δ) - MP-MTL
algorithms.
4.4 Utility Analyses
We build utility analyses specifically for our instantiations,
for example, Algorithm 2 and 3 instead of Algorithm 1,
because (1) Algorithm 1 is a framework that allows the
minimization of a variety of regularization terms and many
optimization schemes. Specifically, Steps 6 and 7 of Al-
gorithm 1 include arbitrary mappings and arbitrary STL
algorithms, respectively. Therefore, the analysis is not trivial
and requires additional assumptions. (2) Algorithm 2 and
3 correspond to trace-norm and group-`1-norm regular-
ization, respectively, which correspond to two mainstream
MTL approaches.
Our utility analyses are built upon the matrix perturba-
tion error bounds of Wishart noise presented by Jiang et al.
[41], the error bounds with arbitrary heterogeneous residues
of inexact proximal-gradient descent presented by Schmidt
et al. [60], and the two optimal solutions for proximal
operators presented by Ji and Ye [39] and Liu et al. [49].
The following parts of the utility analyses are novel: (1)
the derivations of the approximation error bounds for both
the proximal operators in (7) and (8); (2) the derivations of
runtime and utility bounds, considering three cases of com-
position bounds of privacy budgets, two privacy-budget
allocation strategies, two specific regularization terms, both
convex and strongly convex prediction loss functions, and
both the basic and accelerated proximal-gradient methods,
subject to the elaborate composition theorem of privacy; (3)
the optimizations of the utility bounds with respect to the
parameters of privacy-budget allocation strategies.
We studied the utility bounds for three cases of the
composition bound of {t} defined in (6). Here, we report
the results for the following case, because this case provides
the minimum bound for small values of privacy budgets
{t} and δ, such as for + eδ ≤ 1; see Kairouz et al. [42].
 =
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
t
δ
)
.
The results for the other two cases are similar and can be
found in the supplementary material.
First, we make some assumptions.
Parameter space. A bounded parameter space is assumed
for model matrices:
W = {W ∈ Rd×m : max
i∈[m]
‖wi‖2 ≤ K},
where K is the norm clipping parameter.
Properties of objective functions. We consider the loss func-
tion f(W) = 1m
∑m
i=1 Li(Xiwi,yi) and assume that
mf(W) is convex and has an L-Lipschitz-continuous gra-
dient (as defined in Schmidt et al. [60]). Let W∗ =
arg minWmf(W) + λg(W), where g(·) = ‖ · ‖∗ for Al-
gorithm 2 and g(·) = ‖ · ‖2,1 for Algorithm 3. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that W∗ ∈ W and
f(W˜(0)) − f(W∗) = O(K2Lm). We adopt the notation
q = min{d,m}.
The number of tasks. The number of tasks are assumed to
be sufficient as follows.
Assumption 1. For Algorithm 2, we assume that for sufficiently
large C > 0,
m > CK2d2 log2(d)(log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2)/2.
For Algorithm 3, we assume that for sufficiently large C > 0,
m > C log(d)
√
log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2
/
 .
Then, we present the results. Before reporting the utility
bounds, we report two intermediate results: the approxima-
tion error bounds for proximal operators with trace-norm
(low-rank) and group-`1 (group-sparse) penalties, respec-
tively. Note that for both results, the noise matrix E is
allowed to be arbitrary.
Lemma 1 (Low rank). Consider Algorithm 2. For t ∈ [T ], in
the t-th iteration, let C = W˜(t−1). Let rc = rank(C) ≤ q be
the rank of C. Suppose that an index k ≤ q exists such that
σk(C) > ηλ and σk+1(C) ≤ ηλ. Assume that 2σ1(E) ≤√
σj(C)−
√
σj+1(C) for j ∈ [k]. Then, for any random matrix
E ∈ Rd×d, the following holds:
1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖∗
−
{
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖∗
}
≤1
η
(
σ21(C)
ηλ
+ σ1(C)
)
·
[(
k2
ηλ
+ 2k
)
σ1(E) + max(0, rc − k)
√
σ1(E)
]
.
(9)
Lemma 2 (Group Sparse). Consider Algorithm 3. For t ∈ [T ],
in the t-th iteration, let C = W˜(t−1). Let the indices of the
non-zero rows of C be denoted by Ic = {j : Cj 6= 0}, and let
rc,s = |Ic| ≤ d. Let Σ0 = CCT. Suppose that an integer k ≤ d
exists such that
∑d
j=1 I(
√
Σjj,0 ≥ ηλ) = k, where I(·) is the
indicator function. Then, for any random matrix E ∈ Rd×d, the
following holds:
1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖2,1
−
{
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖2,1
}
≤1
η
[
rc,s
ηλ
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)2
+
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)]
·
[
k
2ηλ
max
j∈[d]
|Ejj |+ max(0, rc,s − k) max
j∈[d]
√
|Ejj |
]
.
(10)
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We find that the approximation error bounds both de-
pend on σ1(E) (note that maxj |Ejj | ≤ σ1(E)).
Note that Lemma 1 requires ηλ to fall between the k-
th and the (k + 1)-th singular values in every iteration for
the same k. Under Assumption 1 (the number of tasks is
sufficiently large), when the initial task models in W (0) are
acquired via proper STL methods, a significant margin will
always exist between the k-th and the (k + 1)-th singular
values of the normalized model matrix C for the same k.
Therefore, the above requirement is easily satisfied. It is
similar for the requirement of k in Lemma 2.
Now, we present guarantees regarding both utility and
runtime. In the following, E is assumed to be a Wishart
random matrix in each iteration. The privacy budgets {t}
are considered heterogeneous, i.e., different with respect to
t ∈ [T ].
We consider two cases for the loss function f(W):
convex and strongly convex. For each case, we report the
results of both Algorithms 2 (the low-rank estimator) and 3
(the group-sparse estimator). For each algorithm, we present
the results for both the basic and the accelerated proximal
gradient descent methods.
For the convex case of the loss function f(W), we set
t = Θ(t
α) for α ∈ R and t ∈ [T ]. Define
M0 =
√
log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2
/√
|2α+ 1| ,
which is used for both Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 2 (Low rank - Convexity). Consider Algorithm 2.
For an index k ≤ q that satisfies the conditions given in Lemma
1 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, and λ = Θ(LK√m), assume that
t ≤ 4Kk2d(log d)/q2 for t ∈ [T ]. Define
M = M0Kkd log d/
√
m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m] and then also
set T = Θ(((α/2− 1)2/M)φ(α)) for E = f( 1T
∑T
t=1 Ŵ
(t))−
f(W∗), we have, with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 1)2)φ(α)), (11)
where
φ(α) =

2/(2α+ 1), α > 2;
2/5, −1/2 < α < 2;
1/(2− α), α < −1/2.
(12)
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (t− 1)/(t+ 2) for t ∈ [m]
and then also set T = Θ(((α/2 − 2)2/M)φ(α)/2) for E =
f(Ŵ(T ))− f(W∗), we have, with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 2)2)φ(α)), (13)
where
φ(α) =

4/(2α+ 1), α > 4;
4/9, −1/2 < α < 4;
2/(4− α), α < −1/2.
(14)
Theorem 3 (Group sparse - Convexity). Consider Algorithm
3. For an index k ≤ d that satisfies the condition given in Lemma
2 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, and λ = Θ(LKd√m), assume that
t ≤ k2 log(d)/4Kd(d− k)2m for t ∈ [T ]. Define
M = M0k log d/m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m]and then also
set T = Θ(((α/2− 1)2/M)φ(α)) for E = f( 1T
∑T
t=1 Ŵ
(t))−
f(W∗), we have, with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 1)2)φ(α)), (15)
where φ(α) is defined in (12).
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (t− 1)/(t+ 2) for t ∈ [m]
and then also set T = Θ(((α/2 − 2)2/M)φ(α)/2) for E =
f(Ŵ(T ))− f(W∗), we have, with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 2)2)φ(α)), (16)
where φ(α) is defined in (14).
Next, we assume that mf(W) is µ-strongly convex and
has an L-Lipschitz-continuous gradient, where µ < L. In
this case, we set t = Θ(Q−t) for Q > 0 and t ∈ [T ] and
define
M ′0 =
√
log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2
/√
|1−Q2| ,
which is used for both Theorems 4 and 5.
Theorem 4 (Low rank - Strong convexity). Consider Algo-
rithm 2. For an index k ≤ q that satisfies the conditions given in
Lemma 1 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, and λ = Θ(LK√m), assume
that t ≤ 4Kk2d(log d)/q2 for t ∈ [T ], denoted by
M = M ′0Kkd log d/
√
m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m] and then let Q0 =
1−µ/L and set T = Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q20)((Q0/
√
Q− 1)2/M)) for
E = 1√
m
‖Ŵ(T ) −W∗‖F , we have, with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(Q0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q20)Q0), (17)
where for any Q˜ ∈ (0, 1),
ψ(Q, Q˜) =

Q, 0 < Q < Q˜;
Q˜, Q˜ < Q < 1;
Q˜/Q, Q > 1.
(18)
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (1−
√
µ/L)/(1 +
√
µ/L)
for t ∈ [m] and then let Q′0 = 1 −
√
µ/L and set T =
Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q′0)((
√
Q′0/
√
Q − 1)2/M)) for E = f(Ŵ(T )) −
f(W∗), we have, with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(
√
Q′0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q′0)Q′0), (19)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Theorem 5 (Group sparse - Strong convexity). Consider
Algorithm 3. For an index k ≤ d that satisfies the condition given
in Lemma 2 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, and λ = Θ(LKd√m),
assume that t ≤ k2 log(d)/4Kd(d− k)2m for t ∈ [T ]. Define
M = M ′0k log d/m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m] and then let Q0 =
1−µ/L and set T = Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q20)((Q0/
√
Q− 1)2/M)) for
E = 1√
m
‖Ŵ(T ) −W∗‖F , we have, with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(Q0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q20)Q0), (20)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN ANALYSIS AND MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 11
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (1−
√
µ/L)/(1 +
√
µ/L)
for t ∈ [m] and then let Q′0 = 1 −
√
µ/L and set T =
Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q′0)((
√
Q′0/
√
Q − 1)2/M)) for E = f(Ŵ(T )) −
f(W∗), we have, with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(
√
Q′0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q′0)Q′0), (21)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
4.5 Privacy Budget Allocation
In this section, we optimize the utility bounds presented in
Theorems 2–5 with respect to α and Q, respectively, which
results in optimized privacy-budget allocation strategies.
Then, we discuss the optimized results.
Theorem 6. Consider Algorithms 2 and 3.
For a convex f , we use Theorems 2 and 3.
(1) No acceleration: The bounds for the low-rank and group-
sparse estimators both reach their respective minima w.r.t. α at
α = 0. Meanwhile, φ(α) = 2/5.
(2) Use acceleration: The bounds for low-rank and group-
sparse estimators both reach their respective minima w.r.t. α at
α = 2/5. Meanwhile, φ(α) = 4/9.
For a strongly convex f , we use Theorems 4 and 5.
(1) No acceleration: The bounds for the low-rank and group-
sparse estimators both reach their respective minima w.r.t. Q at
Q = Q
2/5
0 . Meanwhile, logψ(Q,Q20)Q0 = 1/2.
(2) Use acceleration: The bounds for low-rank and group-
sparse estimators both reach their respective minima w.r.t. Q at
Q = (Q′0)
1/5. Meanwhile, logψ(Q,Q′0)Q
′
0 = 1.
The results corresponding to the optimized privacy-
budget allocation strategies (with δ > 0) are summarized
in Table 2, where the terms with respect to K,L, k, and√
log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2 are omitted, and the results associ-
ated with the setting  =
∑T
t=1 t (and δ = 0) are included,
providing (, 0) - MP-MTL algorithms.
Table 2
Utility results.
Low rank Group sparse
δ = 0
No
Acceleration
Convex O(( d log(d)√
m
)
1
3 ) O(( log(d)
m
)
1
3 )
Strong convex O(( d log(d)√
m
)
1
2 ) O(( log(d)
m
)
1
2 )
Use
Acceleration
Convex O(( d log(d)√
m
)
2
5 ) O(( log(d)
m
)
2
5 )
Strong convex O( d log(d)√
m
) O( log(d)
m
)
δ > 0
No
Acceleration
Convex O(( d log(d)√
m
)
2
5 ) O(( log(d)
m
)
2
5 )
Strong convex O(( d log(d)√
m
)
1
2 ) O(( log(d)
m
)
1
2 )
Use
Acceleration
Convex O(( d log(d)√
m
)
4
9 ) O(( log(d)
m
)
4
9 )
Strong convex O( d log(d)√
m
) O( log(d)
m
)
We learn from Theorem 6 that (1) for all four settings, a
non-decreasing series of {t} results in a good utility bound,
since the best α = 0, 2/5 ≥ 0 for t = Θ(tα) and the best
Q = Q
2/5
0 , (Q
′
0)
1/5 < 1 for t = Θ(Q−t). Intuitively, this
means adding non-increasing noise over the iterations—
which is reasonable because the initial iterations may move
quickly in the parameter space while the last iterations
may only fine-tune the model slightly. (2) Both the strong-
convexity condition and the acceleration strategy improve
the utility bounds: both increase the powers of those bounds
that are far less than 1 under Assumption 1. (3) By setting
α and Q to their optimized values, the acceleration strategy
improves the runtime, as shown in Claim 2.
Claim 2. Assume Assumption 1. Consider Theorem 2-5 and set α
and Q to the optimized values in Theorem 6, respectively. Assume
µ/L < 0.3819. The values for T are smaller when using the
acceleration strategy compared to those with no acceleration.
Now, we introduce our concrete strategy in the following
to set {t} in both Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. We assume
that T ,  and δ are given. Note that this strategy is optimal
if α and Q are set according to the optimal settings stated
by Theorem 6.
For a convex f , if no acceleration is to be used, then set
βt = 0 for t ∈ [m] and set α ∈ R (e.g., α = 0); otherwise,
set βt = (t− 1)/(t+ 2) for t ∈ [m] and set α ∈ R (e.g.,
α = 2/5). Then, for t ∈ [T ], let t = 0tα and find the largest
0 that satisfies CB({t}, δ) ≤ , where CB({t}, δ) is the
composition bound of {t} defined in (6).
For a µ-strongly convex mf(W) with a known value of
µ (e.g., µ2 ‖wi‖22 is added to each Li), if no acceleration is to
be used, then set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m] and set Q > 0 (e.g.,
Q = (1− µ/L)2/5, if L is known); otherwise, if L is known,
set βt = (1−
√
µ/L)/(1 +
√
µ/L) for t ∈ [m] and setQ > 0
(e.g., Q = (1−√µ/L)1/5). Then, for t ∈ [T ], let t = 0Q−t
and find the largest 0 that satisfies CB({t}, δ) ≤ , where
CB({t}, δ) is the composition bound of {t} defined in (6).
4.6 Baseline MP-MTL Constructed by IP-MTL
IP-MTL algorithms prevent a single data instance in one task
from leaking to other tasks and are formally defined as
follows.
Definition 8 (IP-MTL). Let A be a randomized MTL algorithm
with a number of iterations T . In the first iteration, A performs
the mapping (W(0) ∈ Rd×m,Dm) → θ1 ∈ C1, where θ1 in-
cludes Ŵ(1) ∈ Rd×m. For t = 2, . . . , T , in the t-th iteration, A
performs the mapping (W(t−1) ∈ Rd×m,Dm, θ1, . . . , θt−1) →
θt ∈ Ct, where θt includes Ŵ(t) ∈ Rd×m. Here, A is an (, δ)
- IP-MTL algorithm if—for all i ∈ [m] and for all neighboring
datasets Dm and (D′)m that differ by a single data instance for
the i-th task—the following holds for some constants , δ ≥ 0 and
for any set S ⊆ Rd×(m−1)×T :
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1),Dm,θ1:t−1))
≤eP(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = ((W′)(t−1), (D′)m,θ1:t−1))
+ δ,
(22)
where for all t ∈ [T ], Bt denotes the input for the t-th iteration,
θ1:t−1 =
{ ∅, t = 1
θ1, θ2, · · · , θt−1, t ≥ 2,
and (W′)(t−1) is associated with the case where a single data
instance for the i-th task has been replaced.
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As examples, the methods of Pathak et al. [58] and Gupta
et al. [34] both fall into this category.
Proposition 2. The methods of both Pathak et al. [58] and Gupta
et al. [34] are IP-MTL algorithms with T = 1 and T ≥ 1,
respectively.
Now we can construct baseline MP-MTL methods by
IP-MTL methods based on result of Proposition 3: to
guarantee an (, δ) - MP-MTL algorithm, one can use an
(/n, δ/(n exp()) - IP-MTL algorithm.
Proposition 3. For task sample sizes of n1, . . . , nm, any (, δ)
- IP-MTL algorithm is a (n, n exp(n)δ) - MP-MTL algorithm
when n = maxi∈[m] ni.
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in the sup-
plementary material, directly following the proof of the
group privacy Lemma stated by Lemma 2.2 of Vadhan [67].
Therefore, Proposition 3 be regarded as the group privacy
property of differential privacy applied to a “group” of the
entire dataset for a single task.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed MP-MTL method.
We evaluate two instantiations of our method, Algorithm
2 and Algorithm 3 with respect to their ability to capture
the low-rank and group-sparse patterns, respectively, in
the model matrix. We use both synthetic and real-world
datasets to evaluate these algorithms. All the algorithms
were implemented in MATLAB.
5.1 Methods for Comparison
We use least-square loss and logistic loss for the least-square
regression and binary classification problems, respectively.
For each setting, we evaluate three types of methods:
1) non-private STL methods, in which each task is learned
independently without the introduction of any perturba-
tion; 2) MP-MTL methods, including our proposed MP-
MTL methods and baseline MP-MTL methods constructed
by IP-MTL methods; and 3) non-private MTL methods,
which correspond to the original MTL methods without the
introduction of any perturbation.
To select the IP-MTL methods for constructing the base-
line MP-MTL methods, because few such approaches have
been proposed, we first consider the DP-MTRL method
proposed by Gupta et al. [34]. The authors of this method
did not consider privacy-loss increase resulting from their
iterative update procedure. We solve this problem in our
comparison by using the same composition technique as in
our method.
We also modified the DP-MTRL method to consider the
Lipschitz constants of the loss functions when computing
the sensitivities in the 4th step of the algorithm, which were
omitted in the Algorithm 1 presented in the cited paper. For
all i ∈ [m], the Lipschitz constant Li of the loss function
Li is estimated as Li = maxj∈[ni] |L′i(xijwi, yij)|, which is
smaller than the true value. Thus, intuitively, we add less
noise to their algorithm than would otherwise be added.
For the binary classification case, we still let DP-MTRL
minimize the least-square loss, because in each of its outer
iterations (which alternately compute the parameter matrix
and its covariance matrix) DP-MTRL requires a closed-form
solution to guarantee the theoretical privacy results. How-
ever, in the logistic loss case, iterative optimization is re-
quired in each outer iteration; consequently, the requirement
of a closed-form solution cannot be satisfied. Therefore,
DP-MTRL provides no privacy guarantee for logistic loss.
Moreover, it is not trivial to modify the DP-MTRL algorithm
for loss functions that require iterative optimization in each
outer iteration because additional leakage will occur in each
inner iteration.
The DP-AGGR method proposed by Pathak et al. [58]
which outputs an averaged model as the final solution, is
also considered to be an IP-MTL method that transforms
into a baseline MP-MTL method.
Remark 3. We continue to refer to the baseline MP-MTL
methods constructed by IP-MTL methods (DP-MTRL and DP-
AGGR) using their respective names.
Differentially private STL methods are not considered
because 1) empirically, they are always outperformed by
non-private STL methods [17, 69], and 2) our MP-MTL
method always outperforms STL methods, as will be
demonstrated later.
5.2 Experimental Setting
For the non-private methods, the regularization parameters
and the numbers of iterations were optimized via 5-fold
cross-validation on the training data , and acceleration was
used without considering the strong convexity of the loss
function f . For the private methods, the regularization pa-
rameters, the number of iterations, the optimization strategy
(whether to use acceleration and whether to consider strong
convexity via adding `2 norm penalties), and the privacy-
budget allocation hyper-parameters (α and Q) under each
privacy loss  were optimized via 5-fold cross-validation on
the training data. In the case considering strong convexity,
µ
2 ‖wi‖22 was added to each Li with µ = 1e− 3.
Note that the parameter tuning step using cross-
validation was not included in the privacy budget for the
algorithms. In this paper, we regarded the hyper-parameters
generated by cross-validation as given not only for our
methods but also for the baseline methods (DP-AGGR and
DP-MTRL). We plan to explore an effective cross-validation
method using the minimum privacy budget with the opti-
mum utility in future work.
For all the experiments, the δ values in the MP-MTL
algorithms were set to 1/m log(m), where m is the number
of tasks as suggested by Abadi et al. [1], and the δ values
in the baseline MP-MTL methods, i.e., DP-MTRL and DP-
AGGR, were set in accordance with Proposition 3.
All the experiments were replicated 100 times under
each model setting.
5.3 Evaluation Metrics
We adopt the evaluation metrics commonly-encountered
in MTL approaches. For least-square regression, we use
nMSE [19, 30], which is defined as the mean squared error
(MSE) divided by the variance of the target vector. For
binary classification, we use the average AUC [20], which
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(a) True (b) DP-MTRL (c) MP-MTL
(d) True (e) DP-MTRL (f) MP-MTL
Figure 3. Task relationships and output model matrices for the synthetic
data experiments: (a), (b) and (c) are task relationship matrices, (d),
(e) and (f) are the output model matrices. The results shown are the
averages of 100 runs with  = 0.1.
is defined as the mean value of the area under the ROC
curve for each task.
5.4 Simulation
We created a synthetic dataset as follows. The number of
tasks was m = 320, the number of training samples for
each task was ni = 30, and the feature dimensionality
of the training samples was d = 30. The entries of the
training data Xi ∈ Rni×d (for the i-th task) were randomly
generated from the normal distributionN (0, 1) before being
normalized such that the `2 norm of each sample was one.
To obtain a low-rank pattern, we first generated a co-
variance matrix Σ ∈ Rm×m as shown in Fig. 3 (a). Then,
the model parameter matrix W ∈ Rd×m (see Fig. 3 (d))
was generated from a matrix variate normal (MVN) distri-
bution [33], i.e., W ∼MVN(0, I,Σ).
To obtain a group-sparse pattern, we generated the
model parameter matrix W ∈ Rd×m such that the first
4 rows were nonzero. The values of the nonzero entries
were generated from a uniform distribution in the range
[−50,−1]⋃[1, 50].
Without loss of generality, we consider only the sim-
ulation of least-square regression. The results for logistic
regression are similar. The response (target) vector for each
task was yi = Xiwi + εi ∈ Rni(i ∈ [m]), where each entry
in the vector εi was randomly generated from N (0, 1).
The test set was generated in the same manner; the
number of test samples was 9ni.
5.4.1 Privacy Budget Allocation
The privacy-budget allocation strategies in Section 4.5 were
evaluated based on the synthetic data associated with the
low-rank model matrix. The results shown in Fig. 4 are
from a 5-fold cross-validation on the training data. The
prediction performances increase when acceleration is used,
and achieve local optima at small positive values of the hor-
izontal axes, which is consistent with our utility analyses. A
local optimum exists in the negative horizontal axis in Fig.
4 (b) when acceleration is used—perhaps because m is not
sufficiently large as assumed in Assumption 1.
(a) Convexity (b) Strong convexity
Figure 4. Evaluations for privacy-budget allocation strategies. In (a), we
set t = Θ(tα), for t ∈ [T ]; in (b), we set t = Θ(Q−t), for t ∈ [T ].
Q0 = 1 − √µ ≈ 0.9684. The results shown are averages of 100 runs
with  = 0.1. For the non-private MTL method, the nMSE was 0.0140.
Figure 5. Noise-to-signal ratios over the iterations of Algorithm 2. The
results shown are averages of 100 runs with  = 0.1.
5.4.2 Noise-to-Signal Ratio
Based on the setting in Section 5.4.1, the noise-to-signal ra-
tios under the best privacy-budget allocation strategy (using
acceleration and considering basic convexity) are shown in
Fig. 5, in which we executed Algorithm 2 on the synthetic
data set with the low-rank pattern. In contrast, for DP-
MTRL, log10(‖E‖F /‖Σ˜
(t)‖F ) = 0.2670 ± 0.0075 under the
best iteration number T = 1. The output model matrices
of DP-MTRL and our method are shown in Fig. 3 (e) and
(f), and their respective covariance matrices are shown in
Fig. 3 (b) and (c), respectively. These plots suggest that
the high levels of noises added in our method had little
influence on the output model matrix and the pattern in its
covariance matrix, because our method adds noise only to
the knowledge-sharing process and our method degrades to
an STL method under high noise levels (as shown in Propo-
sition 1). In contrast, in DP-MTRL, the output model matrix
and the pattern in the covariance matrix are significantly
affected or even destroyed because the noise was added di-
rectly to the model matrix, resulting in negative side-effects.
This result may also have occurred because DP-MTRL is a
local private learning algorithm, which needs a much larger m
to achieve acceptable utility (see the discussion in Section
2.2).
5.4.3 Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff
In Fig. 6, the performances of both of our MP-MTL algo-
rithms (i.e., Algorithms 2 and 3) fall between those of the
non-private STL and non-private MTL methods, suggesting
that our methods are useful as MTL methods but may be
affected by the introduced noise. In Fig. 6 (a), Algorithm
3 underperforms compared with Algorithm 2, because the
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(a) Low-rank pattern
(b) Group-sparse pattern
Figure 6. Privacy-accuracy tradeoff on synthetic datasets. For (a), the
data associated with the low-rank model matrix were used; for (b), the
data associated with the group-sparse model matrix were used. MP-
MTL-LR denotes Algorithm 2, MP-MTL-GS denotes Algorithm 3, and
STL denotes the `2-norm-penalized STL method. In both panels, STL
and MTL denote non-private methods. In (b), the nMSEs of DP-MTRL
are above 0.16; in both panels, the nMSEs of DP-AGGR are above 0.78.
More detailed performances of DP-MTRL and DP-AGGR are presented
in Fig. 7.
true model matrix is not group-sparse. DP-MTRL outper-
forms the STL method and our Algorithm 3 when  is
large because it suits the true model matrix, in which the
relatedness among tasks is modeled by a graph. In Fig. 6 (b),
the true model matrix is group-sparse and is not suitable for
DP-MTRL; hence, DP-MTRL underperforms compared with
the STL method even when  is large. Algorithm 2 rivals
Algorithm 3 because the true model matrix is also low-rank.
In both panels of Fig. 6, Algorithm 2 rivals the non-private
MTL when  = 10.
Fig. 7 shows the detailed performances for DP-MTRL
and DP-AGGR corresponding to those in Fig. 6. Fig. 7 (c)
is used to show that the accuracy of DP-AGGR grows with
 under the same setting as in Fig. 7 (b). As discussed pre-
viously, DP-AGGR performs only model averaging, which
is not suitable for the true model matrices in both settings
of Fig. 7 (a) and (b); hence, the accuracies of DP-AGGR are
much worse than those of the respective STL methods.
5.4.4 Varing the Number of Tasks
Based on the setting in Section 5.4.1, the average perfor-
mances of the first 20 of the 320 total tasks are shown in Fig.
(a) Low-rank pattern (b) Group-sparse pattern
(c) Group-sparse pattern
Figure 7. Detailed privacy-accuracy tradeoff on synthetic datasets for
DP-MTRL and DP-AGGR. For (a), the data associated with the low-rank
model matrix were used; for (b) and (c), the data that associated with the
group-sparse model matrix were used. In (c), the plot shows the same
performances of DP-AGGR as those in (b) but with a finer vertical axis.
Other settings are the same as those used for Fig. 6.
Figure 8. Behaviors based on the number of tasks m used for training.
We used 320 tasks for MTL training.
8 under different numbers of training tasks. The accuracy
increases with the number of tasks involved, which is con-
sistent with our utility analyses. The standard deviation of
each result is plotted in Fig. 8, showing that the increments
are statistically significant.
5.5 Application
5.5.1 Data Description
We also evaluate the considered methods on the following
two real datasets.
School Data. The School dataset1 is a popular dataset for
MTL [30] that consists of the exam scores of 15,362 stu-
dents from 139 secondary schools. Each student is described
by 27 attributes, including both school-specific information
and student-specific information such as gender and ethnic
1. http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/a.argyriou/code/
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group. The problem of predicting exam scores for the stu-
dents can be formulated as an MTL problem: the number of
tasks is m = 139, the data dimensionality is d = 27, and the
number of data samples is
∑
i ni = 15, 362.
LSOA II Data. These data are from the Second Longitudinal
Study of Aging (LSOA II) 2. LSOA II was a collaborative
study conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS) and the National Institute of Aging from 1994 to
2000. A national representative sample of 9, 447 subjects of
70 years of age and older were selected and interviewed.
Three separate interviews were conducted with each sub-
ject, one each during the periods of 1994–1996, 1997–1998,
and 1999–2000, referred to as WAVE 1, WAVE 2, and WAVE
3, respectively. Each wave of interviews included multiple
modules covering a wide range of assessments. We used
data from WAVE 2 and WAVE 3, which include a total
of 4, 299 sample subjects and 44 targets (each subject cor-
responded to 44 targets). We extracted 188 features from
the WAVE 2 interviews. The targets include m = 41
binary outcomes used in this study. These outcomes fall into
several categories: 7 measures of fundamental daily activity,
13 of extended daily activity, 5 of social involvement, 8 of
medical condition, 4 of cognitive ability, and 4 of sensation
condition.
The features include demographic, family structure,
daily personal care, medical history, social activity, health
opinions, behavior, nutrition, health insurance and income
and asset attributes, the majority of which are binary values.
Both the targets and the features have missing values
due to non-responsed and questionnaire filtering. The av-
erage missing value rates of the targets and features are
13.7% and 20.2%, respectively. To address the missing values
among the features, we adopted the following preprocessing
procedure. For the continuous features, missing values were
imputed with the sample mean. For binary features, it is
better to treat the missing values as a third category because
the absence of a value may also carry important information.
Therefore, two dummy variables were created for each
binary feature with missing values (no third variable is
necessary in such a case) resulting in a total of d = 295 fea-
tures. To address the missing values among the targets, we
included the samples associated with the observed targets
for each task, resulting in maxi∈[m] ni = 3, 473.
For both the real-world datasets, We randomly selected
30% of the samples from each task to form the training set
and used the remaining samples as the test set. For all the
tasks, each data point was normalized to have a unit length.
5.5.2 Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff
From Fig. 9, we can observe results similar to those seen in
Fig. 6. In addition, our MP-MTL algorithms outperform the
baseline MP-MTL methods, DP-MTRL and DP-AGGR, espe-
cially when  is small. DP-AGGR underperforms compared
with the STL method because its model averaging approach
assumes that the tasks are homogeneous. In Fig. 9 (b), the
aAUC values of DP-MTRL and our Algorithms (2 and 3)
increase slowly because the feature dimension is large and
the number of tasks is insufficient, which is consistent with
our utility analyses.
2. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/lsoa/lsoa2.htm.
(a) School Data (b) LSOA II Data
Figure 9. Privacy-accuracy tradeoff on real-world datasets. In both pan-
els, MTL denotes the method with the best performance among the
four non-private MTL methods proposed by Ji and Ye [39], Liu et al.
[49], Zhang and Yeung [77] and DP-AGGR without perturbations; MP-
MTL-LR denotes Algorithm 2, whereas MP-MTL-GS denotes Algorithm
3; STL denotes the method with the better performance between the `1-
and `2-regularized methods. In (b), the aAUCs of DP-AGGR are below
0.66. The detailed performances of DP-AGGR are presented in Fig. 10.
(a) School Data (b) LSOA II Data
Figure 10. Detailed privacy-accuracy tradeoff on real-world datasets for
DP-AGGR. All the settings are the same as those in Fig. 9.
Fig. 10 shows the detailed performances of DP-AGGR. In
Fig. 10 (b), because the dimension is large and the number of
tasks is insufficient, the accuracy of DP-AGGR barely grows
with .
Because the MTL behavior may change when the
training-data percentage (the size of the training data di-
vided by the size of the entire dataset) changes, we eval-
uated the methods on both real-world datasets at different
training-data percentages and achieved similar results; see
the supplementary material for more details.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed the potential security risks of
multi-task learning approaches and presented a rigorous
mathematical formulation of the model-protected multi-
task learning (MP-MTL) problem. We proposed an algo-
rithmic framework for implementing MP-MTL along with
two concrete framework instantiations that learn the low-
rank and group-sparse patterns in the model matrix. We
demonstrated that our algorithms are guaranteed not to
underperform compared with single-task learning meth-
ods under high noise levels. Privacy guarantees were pro-
vided. The utility analyses suggested that both the strong-
convexity condition and the acceleration strategy improve
the utility bounds, and that the acceleration strategy also
improves the runtime. A utility analysis for privacy-budget
allocation yielded a recommendation for privacy budgets
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that are non-decreasing over the iterations. The experi-
ments demonstrated that our algorithms significantly out-
perform baseline methods constructed by existing privacy-
preserving MTL methods on the proposed model-protection
problem. Some interesting future research directions include
developing concrete MP-MTL algorithms for other MTL
approaches and other optimization schemes.
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Supplemental Materials: Model-Protected
Multi-Task Learning
APPENDIX A
MODEL-DECOMPOSED MP-MTL METHODS
In this section, we consider the extension of our MP-MTL
framework for MTL methods using the decomposed parame-
ter/model matrix. Specifically, we focus on the following prob-
lem, where the trace norm is used for knowledge sharing across
tasks and the ‖·‖1 norm (sum of the `1 norm for vectors) is used
for entry-wise outlier detection, as described in Algorithm 4.
min
W
∑m
i=1
Li(Xiwi,yi) + λ1‖P‖∗ + λ2‖Q‖1
s.t. W = P + Q,
(23)
where P,Q ∈ Rd×m.
Algorithm 4 Model-Protected low-rank and group-sparse
(MP-LR-SP) Estimator
Input: Datasets (Xm,ym) = {(X1,y1), . . . , (Xm,ym)}, where
∀i ∈ [m], Xi ∈ Rni×d and yi ∈ Rni×1. Privacy loss
, δ ≥ 0. Number of iterations T . Step size η. Regularization
parameter λ1, λ2 > 0. Norm clipping parameter K > 0.
Acceleration parameters {βt}. Initial models of tasks W(0).
Output: Ŵ(1:T ) .
1: Set {t} such that CB({t}, δ) ≤ , where CB({t}, δ) is
the composition bound of {t}.
2: Let P(0) = Q(0) = Q̂(0) = W(0).
3: for t = 1 : T do
4: Norm clipping: p˜(t−1)i = p
(t−1)
i /max(1,
‖p(t−1)i ‖2
K
) for all
i ∈ [m]. Let P̂(0) = P˜(0).
5: Σ˜
(t)
= P˜(t−1)(P˜(t−1))T.
6: Σ(t) = Σ˜
(t−1)
+E, where E ∼Wd(d+1, K22t Id) is a sample
of the Wishart distribution.
7: Perform SVD decomposition: UΛUT = Σ(t).
8: Let Sηλ1 be a diagonal matrix and let Sηλ1,ii =
max{0, 1− ηλ1/
√
Λii} for i = 1, . . . ,min{d,m}.
9: M(t) = USηλ1U
T.
10: Let pˆ(t)i = M
(t)p˜
(t−1)
i for all i ∈ [m].
11: Let qˆ(t)i = sign(q
(t−1)
i ) ◦ max{0, |q(t−1)i | − ηλ2} for all
i ∈ [m], where ◦ denotes the entry-wise product.
12: Let Ŵ(t) = P̂(t) + Q̂(t).
13: Let z(t)i,p = pˆ
(t)
i + βt(pˆ
(t)
i − pˆ(t−1)i ) for all i ∈ [m].
14: Let z(t)i,q = qˆ
(t)
i + βt(qˆ
(t)
i − qˆ(t−1)i ) for all i ∈ [m].
15: p(t)i = z
(t)
i,p − η
∂Li(Xi(z(t)i,p+z
(t)
i,q),yi)
∂pˆ
(t)
i
for all i ∈ [m].
16: q(t)i = z
(t)
i,q − η
∂Li(Xi(z(t)i,p+z
(t)
i,q),yi)
∂qˆ
(t)
i
for all i ∈ [m].
17: end for
We note that in Algorithm 4, the role of P is the same as
the role of W in Algorithm 2, and the additional procedures
introduced to update Q are still STL algorithms. As such, we
have the result in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. Algorithm 4 is an (, δ) MP-MTL algorithm.
Proof. For simplicity, we omit the symbol B to denote the input
in the conditional events in some equations.
Use Corollary 1 and Theorem 1. Given t ∈ [T ], the algorithm
(P˜(t−1),Σ(1:t−1)) → (M(t),Σ(t)) is an (t, 0)-differentially pri-
vate algorithm, where M(t) = USηλUT.
Now, for all i ∈ [m], applying the Post-Processing immunity
property (Property 1) for the mapping f : (M(t), p˜(t−1)[−i] ) →
pˆ
(t−1)
[−i] , which does not touch any unperturbed sensitive infor-
mation of the i-th task, we have for any set S ⊆ Rd×(m−1) that
P(pˆ(t−1)[−i] ∈ S | P˜(t−1),Σ(1:t−1))
≤etP(pˆ(t−1)[−i] ∈ S | (P˜′)(t−1),Σ(1:t−1)),
where P˜(t−1) and (P˜′)(t−1) differ only in the i-th column.
Then, because in the t-th iteration the mapping Q(t−1) →
Q̂(t−1) is a deterministic STL algorithm, we have for any set
S ⊆ Rd×(m−1) that
P(qˆ(t−1)[−i] ∈ S | Q(t−1))
=P(qˆ(t−1)[−i] ∈ S | q(t−1)[−i] ,q(t−1)i )
=P(qˆ(t−1)[−i] ∈ S | q(t−1)[−i] , (q′i)(t−1))
=e0P(qˆ(t−1)[−i] ∈ S | (Q′)(t−1)) + 0,
where Q(t−1) and (Q′)(t−1) differ only in the i-th column.
Then applying Combination property (Property 3), we have
for any set S ⊆ Rd×(m−1) × Rd×(m−1)
P((pˆ(t−1)[−i] , qˆ
(t−1)
[−i] ) ∈ S | P(t−1),Σ(1:t−1),Q(t−1))
≤etP((pˆ(t−1)[−i] , qˆ(t−1)[−i] ) ∈ S | (P′)(t−1),Σ(1:t−1), (Q′)(t−1)),
Because the mapping(P̂(t−1), Q̂(t−1),Dm) → (P̂(t), Q̂(t))
is a deterministic STL algorithm, applying the Post-Processing
immunity property (Property 1), we further have for any set
S ⊆ Rd×(m−1) × Rd×(m−1) that
P((pˆ(t)[−i], qˆ
(t)
[−i]) ∈ S | P(t−1),Σ(1:t−1),Q(t−1),Dm)
≤etP((pˆ(t)[−i], qˆ(t)[−i]) ∈ S | (P′)(t−1),Σ(1:t−1), (Q′)(t−1), (D′)m),
where (D′)m differs from Dm in the entire dataset of the i-th
task.
Now, using Theorem 1, for t = 1, . . . , T , we again take the
t-th dataset D˜t = {(p(t−1)1 ,q(t−1)1 ,D1), . . . , (p(t−1)m ,q(t−1)m Dm)}
and denote ϑt,i = (qˆ
(t)
[−i], qˆ
(t)
[−i],M
(t),Σ(t)) ∈ Ct,i. Given the fact
that P(t) = P̂(t) and Q(t) = Q̂(t) for all t ∈ [T ], we have for any
set St,i ⊆ Ct,i that
P(ϑt,i ∈ St,i | D˜t,ϑ1:t−1)
≤etP(ϑt,i ∈ St,i | D˜′t,ϑ1:t−1),
where D˜t and D˜′t are two adjacent datasets that differ in a single
entry, the i-th “data instance” (p(t−1)i ,q
(t−1)
i ,Di = (Xi,yi)),
and
ϑ1:t−1 =
{ ∅, t = 1
(ϑ1,1, . . . , ϑ1,m) . . . , (ϑt−1,1, . . . , ϑt−1,m), t ≥ 2.
This renders the algorithm in the t-th iteration as an (t, 0)-
differentially private algorithm.
Then, again by the Adaptive composition property (Property
4), for all i ∈ [m] and for any set S ′ ⊆⊗Tt=1 Cti , we have
P((ϑ1,i, · · · , ϑT,i) ∈ S ′ |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (D˜t,ϑ1:t−1)))
≤e˜P((ϑ1,i, · · · , ϑT,i) ∈ S ′ |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (D˜′t,ϑ1:t−1)))
+ δ,
where for all t ∈ [T ], Bt denotes the input for the t-th iteration.
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Finally, for all t ∈ [T ], taking θt = (ϑt,1, . . . , ϑt,m) and given
the fact that Ŵ(t) = P̂(t) + Q̂(t), we have for any set S ⊆
Rd×(m−1)×T that
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1),Dm,θ1:t−1))
≤eP(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = ((W′)(t−1), (D′)m,θ1:t−1))
+ δ,
where (W′)(t−1) are associated with the setting in which the
i-th task has been replaced.
Remark 4. Based on Algorithm 4, this will result in a similar
procedure and identical theoretical results with respect to privacy by
replacing the trace norm with the `2,1 norm to force group sparsity in
P or by replacing the ‖ · ‖1 norm with the `1,2 norm (sum of the `2
norm of column vectors) or ‖ · ‖2F (square of the Frobenius norm).
APPENDIX B
MP-MTL FRAMEWORK WITH SECURE MULTI-
PARTY COMPUTATION
Pathak et al. [58] considered the demand for secure multi-party
computation (SMC): protecting data instances from leaking to
the curator and leaking between tasks during joint learning.
However, by Proposition 3, the method of Pathak et al. [58]
may introduce excess noise to protect both the data instances
and the models simultaneously. To avoid unnecessary noise, we
consider a divide-and-conquer strategy to ensure privacy for a
single data instance and the model separately. Specifically, in
each iteration of the MP-MTL algorithms, we perform private
sharing after introducing the perturbation to the parameter ma-
trix to protect a single data instance, as described in Algorithm
5, where a noise vector is added in Step 4 to the model vector
based on sensitivity of replacing a single data instance.
The results in Proposition 4 show that we can simultane-
ously protect a single data instance and the model using such
a divide-and-conquer strategy. Because it is not necessary to
protect all the data instances in each task using data-protected
algorithms, the perturbation for data-instance protection can be
reduced.
Proposition 4. Use Property 1 and Theorem 1. Algorithm 5 is
an (mp, δmp) - MP-MTL algorithm and an (dp, δdp) - IP-MTL
algorithm.
Proof. For simplicity, we omit the symbol B used to denote the
input in the conditional events in some equations.
First, the 4-th step is a standard output perturbation
of Chaudhuri et al. [17] with the `2 sensitivity maxw˜i,w˜′i ‖w˜i −
w˜′i‖2 ≤ ‖w˜i‖2 + ‖w˜′i‖2 ≤ 2K, where w˜i and w˜′i are arbitrary
vectors with the maximum norm of K; thus, we have for all
i ∈ [m], for all neighboring datasets Dm and (D′)m that differ
in a single data instance of the i-th task, and for any set S ∈ Rd,
P(w˜(t−1)i ∈ S | w˜(0:t−2)i ,Dm,M(t−1))
≤ exp(dp,t)P(w˜
(t−1)
i ∈ S | w˜(0:t−2)i , (D′)m,M(t−1)),
where w˜(0:t−2)i = ∅ when t = 1.
Then, because the mapping (W˜(t−1),Σ(1:t−1)) → θt =
(Σ(t),M(t),W˜(t−1)) ∈ Ct does not touch any unperturbed
sensitive information of (Xi,yi,w
(0:t−1)
i ), the Post-Processing
immunity property (Property 1) can be applied such that we
have for any set S ′ ⊆ Ct that
P(θt ∈ S ′ | W˜(0:t−2),Dm,M(t−1))
≤ exp(dp,t)P(θt ∈ S ′ | W˜(0:t−2), (D′)m,M(t−1)),
Algorithm 5 MP-MTL framework with Secure Multi-party
Computation (SMC)
Input: Datasets (Xm,ym) = {(X1,y1), . . . , (Xm,ym)}, where
∀i ∈ [m], Xi ∈ Rni×d and yi ∈ Rni×1. Privacy loss for
model protection mp, δmp ≥ 0. Privacy loss for single data
instance protection dp ≥ 0. Number of iterations T . Shared
information matrices M(0). Initial models of tasks W(0).
Output: Ŵ(1:T ) .
1: Set {mp,t} such that CB({mp,t}, δmp) ≤ , where
CB({mp,t}, δmp) is the composition bound of {mp,t}.,
taking t = mp,t,  = mp, δ = δmp.
2: Set {dp,t} such that CB({dp,t}, 0) ≤ dp, taking t =
dp,t,  = dp, δ = δdp.
3: for t = 1 : T do
4: w˜(t−1)i = w
(t−1)
i /max(1,
‖w(t−1)i ‖2
K
) + bi, where bi is a
sample with the density function of
p(bi) ∝ exp
(
− 2K
dp,t
‖bi‖2
)
,
for all i ∈ [m]. Let Ŵ(0) = W˜(0).
5: Σ˜
(t)
= W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T (or Σ˜
(t)
= (W˜(t−1))TW˜(t−1)).
6: Σ(t) = Σ˜
(t)
+ E, where E ∼ Wd(d + 1, K22mp,t Id) (or
E ∼ Wm(m + 1, K22mp,t Im)) is a sample of the Wishart
distribution.
7: Perform an arbitrary mapping f : Σ(1:t) →M(t).
8: wˆ(t)i = Ast,i(M(t), w˜(0:t−1)i ,Xi,yi) for all i ∈ [m], where
w
(0:t−1)
i are for the initialization.
9: Set the input for the next iteration: W(t) = Ŵ(t).
10: end for
which means that
P(θt ∈ S ′ | Dm,θ1:t−1)
≤ exp(dp,t)P(θt ∈ S ′ | (D′)m,θ1:t−1),
where
θ1:t−1 =
{ ∅, t = 1
θ1, θ2, · · · , θt−1, t ≥ 2.
Then, by the Adaptive composition property (Property 4), we
have for any set S ′′ ⊆⊗Tt=1 Ct that
P(θ1:T ∈ S ′′ |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (Dm,θ1:t−1)))
≤ exp(dp)P(θ1:T ∈ S ′′ |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = ((D′)m,θ1:t−1)))
+ δdp.
Because the mapping (θt,D[−i], w˜(0:t−2)[−i] ,W(t−1)) → wˆ(t)[−i]
does not touch any unperturbed sensitive information of
(Xi,yi,w
(0:t−1)
i ) for all t ∈ [T ] (W(t−1) is actually not
used in the mapping), the Post-Processing immunity property
(Property 1) can be applied such that we have for any set
S0 ⊆ Rd×(m−1)×T that
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S0 |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (Dm,θ1:t−1,W(t−1))))
≤e
dp,tP(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S0 |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = ((D′)m,θ1:t−1, (W′)(t−1))))
+ δdp,
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where (W′)(t−1) is associated with the setting in which a single
data instance of the i-th task has been replaced.
Therefore, Algorithm 5 is an (dp, δdp) - IP-MTL algorithm.
Next, for the conditional density of Σ(t) given W(t−1), we
have
p(Σ(t) |W(t−1))
=
∫
W˜(t−1)
p(Σ(t) |W(t−1),W˜(t−1))
p(W˜(t−1) |W(t−1))dW˜(t−1)
=
∫
W˜(t−1)
p(Σ(t) | W˜(t−1))p(W˜(t−1) |W(t−1))dW˜(t−1)
=
∫
W˜(t−1)
p(Σ(t) | W˜(t−1))
m∏
i=1
p(w˜
(t−1)
i | w(t−1)i )dW˜(t−1).
Because, for all i ∈ [m] and some constant c = s˜
(t−1)
i
dp,t
, we
have
p(w˜
(t−1)
i | w(t−1)i ) ∝ exp
(
−c‖w˜(t−1)i −w(t−1)i ‖2
)
,
given (W′)(t−1) such that for some i ∈ [m], (w′i)(t−1) 6= w(t−1)i ,
letting (w˜′i)(t−1) = w˜
(t−1)
i −w(t−1)i + (w′i)(t−1), we have
‖(w˜′i)(t−1) − (w′i)(t−1)‖2 = ‖w˜(t−1)i −w(t−1)i ‖2
⇒ p((w˜′i)(t−1) | w(t−1)i ) = p(w˜(t−1)i | w(t−1)i ),
and d(w˜′i)(t−1) = dw˜
(t−1)
i .
Furthermore, based on the proof of Theorem 1 in Sec-
tion G.3, we know that for neighboring matrices W˜(t−1) and
(W˜′)(t−1) that differ in the i-th column, we have
p(Σ(t) | W˜(t−1)) ≤ exp(mp,t)p(Σ(t) | (W˜′)(t−1)).
Therefore, for all i ∈ [m], given (W′)(t−1) such that
(w′i)
(t−1) 6= w(t−1)i , under the choice for (w˜′i)(t−1), we have
p(Σ(t) |W(t−1))
=
∫
W˜(t−1)
p(Σ(t) | W˜(t−1))
m∏
j=1
p(w˜
(t−1)
j | w(t−1)j )dW˜(t−1)
≤
∫
(W˜′)(t−1)
e
mp,tp(Σ(t) | (W˜′)(t−1))p((w˜′i)(t−1) | (w′i)(t−1))∏
j∈[m],j 6=i
p(w˜
(t−1)
j | w(t−1)j )d(W˜′)(t−1).
=
∫
(W˜′)(t−1)
exp(mp,t)p(Σ(t) | (W˜′)(t−1))
p((W˜′)(t−1) | (W′)(t−1))d(W˜′)(t−1)
= exp(mp,t)p(Σ(t) | (W′)(t−1)),
which renders the mapping W(t−1) → Σ(t) as an
(exp(mp,t), 0) - differentially private algorithm.
Then, according to the proof of Theorem 1 in Section G.3,
Algorithm 5 is an (mp, δmp) - MP-MTL algorithm.
APPENDIX C
RESULTS OF UTILITY ANALYSES UNDER OTHER
TWO SETTINGS
Here we consider the other two settings of {t}.
C.1 Setting No.1
In this setting, we have
 =
T∑
t=1
t.
First, we consider heterogeneous privacy budgets and set
t = Θ(t
α) for α ∈ R and t ∈ [T ] for the convex case. In this
case, denote by
M0 = 1/|α+ 1|.
Theorem 7 (Low rank - Convexity - Setting No.1). Consider
Algorithm 2. For an index k ≤ q that suffices the definition in
Lemma 1 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LK√m), assume
t ≤ 4Kk2d(log d)/q2 for t ∈ [T ]. Denote by
M = M0Kkd log d/
√
m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m], then setting T =
Θ(((α/2 − 1)2/M)φ(α)) for E = f( 1
T
∑T
t=1 Ŵ
(t)) − f(W∗), we
have with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 1)2)φ(α)), (24)
where
φ(α) =
 1/(α+ 1), α > 2;1/3, −1 < α < 2;1/(2− α), α < −1. (25)
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (t− 1)/(t+ 2) for t ∈ [m], then
setting T = Θ(((α/2−2)2/M)φ(α)/2) for E = f(Ŵ(T ))−f(W∗),
we have with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 2)2)φ(α)), (26)
where
φ(α) =
 2/(α+ 1), α > 4;2/5, −1 < α < 4;2/(4− α), α < −1. (27)
Proof. First, consider the case with no acceleration. We first use
Proposition 1 of Schmidt et al. [60] by regarding procedures
from Step 4 to Step 9 as approximation for the proximal
operator in (7). Note that the norm clipping only bounds the
parameter space and does not affect the results of Schmidt et al.
[60]. Then for εt defined in Lemma 6 for t ∈ [T ], we have
E = 2L
m(T + 1)2
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F
+ 2
T∑
t=1
t
√
2εt
L
+
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
t2
εt
L
)2
.
Meanwhile, by Lemma 6, we have
εt = O
(
κ
t
)
,
where κ = K
3√mkd log d
η
.
On the other hand, let
c1 =  =
T∑
t=1
t,
then by Lemma 10, we have
T∑
t=1
√
εt =

O
(√
κTα+1
c1(α/2−1)2(α+1)
)
, α > 2;
O
(√
κT3
c1(α/2−1)2(α+1)
)
, −1 < α < 2;
O
(√
κT2−α
c1(α/2−1)2(−α−1)
)
, α < −1,
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Because W˜(0) is the result of the norm clipping, we have
W˜(0) ∈ W .
Finally, taking c3 = φ(α) defined in (12) and c4 =
κ
c2(α/2−1)2|α+1| , under the assumption that W∗ ∈ W , using
Lemma 12, we have the results for the case with no acceleration.
For the accelerated case, we use Proposition 2 of Schmidt
et al. [60] to have
E = 2L
m(T + 1)2
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F
+ 2
T∑
t=1
t
√
2εt
L
+
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
t2
εt
L
)2
.
Then one can prove similarly combining Lemma 6, Lemma 9,
Lemma 10 and Lemma 13.
Theorem 8 (Group sparse - Convexity - Setting No.1). Consider
Algorithm 3. For an index k ≤ d that suffices the definition in
Lemma 2 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LKd√m), assume
t ≤ k2 log(d)/4Kd(d− k)2m for t ∈ [T ]. Denote by
M = M0k log d/m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m], then setting T =
Θ(((α/2 − 1)2/M)φ(α)) for E = f( 1
T
∑T
t=1 Ŵ
(t)) − f(W∗), we
have with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 1)2)φ(α)), (28)
where φ(α) is defined in (25).
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (t− 1)/(t+ 2) for t ∈ [m], then
setting T = Θ(((α/2−2)2/M)φ(α)/2) for E = f(Ŵ(T ))−f(W∗),
we have with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 2)2)φ(α)), (29)
where φ(α) is defined in (27).
Proof. First, consider the case with no acceleration. We use
Proposition 1 of Schmidt et al. [60] and prove similarly as in the
proof for Theorem 7, combining Lemma 7, Lemma 9, Lemma
10 and Lemma 12.
For the accelerated case, we use Proposition 2 of Schmidt
et al. [60] and prove similarly as in the proof for Theorem 7,
combining Lemma 7, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 13.
Now we further assume that mf(W) is µ-strongly convex
and has L-Lipschitz-continuous gradient, where µ < L. We set
t = Θ(Q
−t) for Q > 0 and t ∈ [T ] for this case. In this case,
denote by
M ′0 = 1/|1−Q|.
Theorem 9 (Low rank - Strong convexity - Setting No.1).
Consider Algorithm 2. For an index k ≤ q that suffices the definition
in Lemma 1 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LK√m), assume
t ≤ 4Kk2d(log d)/q2 for t ∈ [T ]. Denote by
M = M ′0Kkd log d/
√
m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m], then denoting Q0 =
1− µ/L and setting T = Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q20)((Q0/
√
Q− 1)2/M)) for
E = 1√
m
‖Ŵ(T ) −W∗‖F , we have with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(Q0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q20) Q0), (30)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (1−
√
µ/L)/(1 +
√
µ/L) for
t ∈ [m], then denoting Q′0 = 1 −
√
µ/L and setting T =
Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q′0)
((
√
Q′0/
√
Q−1)2/M)) for E = f(Ŵ(T ))−f(W∗),
we have with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(
√
Q′0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q′0) Q
′
0), (31)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Proof. First, consider the case with no acceleration. We use
Proposition 3 of Schmidt et al. [60] to have
E = Q
T
0√
m
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F + 2
T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
2εt
L
)
.
Then one can prove similarly as in the proof for Theorem 7,
combining Lemma 6, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 14.
For the accelerated case, we use Proposition 4 of Schmidt
et al. [60] to have
E =(Q0)
T
m
(√
2(f(Ŵ(0))− f(W∗)) + 2
√
L
µ
T∑
t=1
√
εt(Q0)−t
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
εt(Q0)−t
)2
.
Then one can prove similarly as in the proof for Theorem 7,
using the assumption that f(W˜(0)) − f(W∗) = O(K2Lm),
combining Lemma 6, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 15.
Theorem 10 (Group sparse - Strong convexity - Setting No.1).
Consider Algorithm 3. For an index k ≤ dthat suffices the definition
in Lemma 2 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LKd√m), assume
t ≤ k2 log(d)/4Kd(d− k)2m for t ∈ [T ]. Denote by
M = M ′0k log d/m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m], then denoting Q0 =
1− µ/L and setting T = Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q20)((Q0/
√
Q− 1)2/M)) for
E = 1√
m
‖Ŵ(T ) −W∗‖F , we have with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(Q0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q20) Q0), (32)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (1−
√
µ/L)/(1 +
√
µ/L) for
t ∈ [m], then denoting Q′0 = 1 −
√
µ/L and setting T =
Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q′0)
((
√
Q′0/
√
Q−1)2/M)) for E = f(Ŵ(T ))−f(W∗),
we have with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(
√
Q′0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q′0) Q
′
0), (33)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Proof. First, consider the case with no acceleration. We use
Proposition 3 of Schmidt et al. [60] and prove similarly as in the
proof for Theorem 7, combining Lemma 7, Lemma 9, Lemma
10 and Lemma 14.
For the accelerated case, we use Proposition 4 of Schmidt
et al. [60] and prove similarly as in the proof for Theorem
7, using the assumption that f(W˜(0)) − f(W∗) = O(K2Lm),
combining Lemma 7, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 15.
Then we optimize the utility bounds with respect to the
respective budget allocation strategies.
Theorem 11 (Budget allocation - Setting No.1). Consider Algo-
rithm 2 and Algorithm 3.
For convex f , use Theorem 7 and Theorem 8.
(1) No acceleration: Both the bounds for low-rank and group-
sparse estimators achieve their respective minimums w.r.t. α at α = 0.
Meanwhile, φ(α) = 1/3.
(2) Accelerated: Both the bounds for low-rank and group-sparse
estimators achieve their respective minimums w.r.t. α at α = 2/3.
Meanwhile, φ(α) = 2/5.
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For strongly convex f , use Theorem 9 and Theorem 10.
(1) No acceleration: Both the bounds for low-rank and group-
sparse estimators achieve their respective minimums w.r.t. Q at Q =
Q
2/3
0 . Meanwhile, logψ(Q,Q20)Q0 = 1/2.
(2) Accelerated: Both the bounds for low-rank and group-
sparse estimators achieve their respective minimums w.r.t. Q at
Q = (Q′0)
1/3. Meanwhile, logψ(Q,Q′0)Q
′
0 = 1.
Proof. Consider the bound in (24). First, by Assumption 1, E is
minimized by maximizing φ(α) and (α/2−1)2|α+1|, which are
maximized simultaneously when α = 0. Results under other
settings can be proved similarly.
C.2 Setting No.2
In this setting, we have
 =
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
1
δ
)
.
First, we consider heterogeneous privacy budgets and set
t = Θ(t
α) for α ∈ R and t ∈ [T ] for the convex case. In this
case, denote by
M0 =
√
log(1/δ) + 2
/√
|2α+ 1| .
Theorem 12 (Low rank - Convexity - Setting No.2). Consider
Algorithm 2. For an index k ≤ q that suffices the definition in
Lemma 1 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LK√m), assume
t ≤ 4Kk2d(log d)/q2 for t ∈ [T ]. Denote by
M = M0Kkd log d/
√
m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m], then setting T =
Θ(((α/2 − 1)2/M)φ(α)) for E = f( 1
T
∑T
t=1 Ŵ
(t)) − f(W∗), we
have with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 1)2)φ(α)), (34)
where
φ(α) =
 2/(2α+ 1), α > 2;2/5, −1/2 < α < 2;1/(2− α), α < −1/2. (35)
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (t− 1)/(t+ 2) for t ∈ [m], then
setting T = Θ(((α/2−2)2/M)φ(α)/2) for E = f(Ŵ(T ))−f(W∗),
we have with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 2)2)φ(α)), (36)
where
φ(α) =
 4/(2α+ 1), α > 4;4/9, −1/2 < α < 4;2/(4− α), α < −1/2. (37)
Proof. It is the corollary of Theorem 2, replacing the term√
log(e+ /δ) with the term
√
log(1/δ) by Lemma 9.
Theorem 13 (Group sparse - Convexity - Setting No.2). Consider
Algorithm 3. For an index k ≤ d that suffices the definition in
Lemma 2 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LKd√m), assume
t ≤ k2 log(d)/4Kd(d− k)2m for t ∈ [T ]. Denote by
M = M0k log d/m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m], then setting T =
Θ(((α/2 − 1)2/M)φ(α)) for E = f( 1
T
∑T
t=1 Ŵ
(t)) − f(W∗), we
have with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 1)2)φ(α)), (38)
where φ(α) is defined in (35).
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (t− 1)/(t+ 2) for t ∈ [m], then
setting T = Θ(((α/2−2)2/M)φ(α)/2) for E = f(Ŵ(T ))−f(W∗),
we have with high probability,
E = O(K2L(M/(α/2− 2)2)φ(α)), (39)
where φ(α) is defined in (37).
Proof. It is the corollary of Theorem 3, replacing the term√
log(e+ /δ) with the term
√
log(1/δ) by Lemma 9.
Now we further assume that mf(W) is µ-strongly convex
and has L-Lipschitz-continuous gradient, where µ < L. We set
t = Θ(Q
−t) for Q > 0 and t ∈ [T ] for this case. In this case,
denote by
M ′0 =
√
log(1/δ) + 2
/√
|1−Q2| .
Theorem 14 (Low rank - Strong convexity - Setting No.2).
Consider Algorithm 2. For an index k ≤ q that suffices the definition
in Lemma 1 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LK√m), assume
t ≤ 4Kk2d(log d)/q2 for t ∈ [T ]. Denote by
M = M ′0Kkd log d/
√
m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m], then denoting Q0 =
1− µ/L and setting T = Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q20)((Q0/
√
Q− 1)2/M)) for
E = 1√
m
‖Ŵ(T ) −W∗‖F , we have with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(Q0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q20) Q0), (40)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (1−
√
µ/L)/(1 +
√
µ/L) for
t ∈ [m], then denoting Q′0 = 1 −
√
µ/L and setting T =
Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q′0)
((
√
Q′0/
√
Q−1)2/M)) for E = f(Ŵ(T ))−f(W∗),
we have with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(
√
Q′0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q′0) Q
′
0), (41)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Proof. It is the corollary of Theorem 4, replacing the term√
log(e+ /δ) with the term
√
log(1/δ) by Lemma 9.
Theorem 15 (Group sparse - Strong convexity - Setting No.2).
Consider Algorithm 3. For an index k ≤ dthat suffices the definition
in Lemma 2 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LKd√m), assume
t ≤ k2 log(d)/4Kd(d− k)2m for t ∈ [T ]. Denote by
M = M ′0k log d/m.
No acceleration: If we set βt = 0 for t ∈ [m], then denoting Q0 =
1− µ/L and setting T = Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q20)((Q0/
√
Q− 1)2/M)) for
E = 1√
m
‖Ŵ(T ) −W∗‖F , we have with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(Q0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q20) Q0), (42)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Use acceleration: If we set βt = (1−
√
µ/L)/(1 +
√
µ/L) for
t ∈ [m], then denoting Q′0 = 1 −
√
µ/L and setting T =
Θ(log1/ψ(Q,Q′0)
((
√
Q′0/
√
Q−1)2/M)) for E = f(Ŵ(T ))−f(W∗),
we have with high probability,
E = O(K(M/(
√
Q′0/
√
Q− 1)2)logψ(Q,Q′0) Q
′
0), (43)
where ψ(·, ·) is defined in (18).
Proof. It is the corollary of Theorem 5, replacing the term√
log(e+ /δ) with the term
√
log(1/δ) by Lemma 9.
Then we optimize the utility bounds with respect to the
respective budget allocation strategies.
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Theorem 16 (Budget allocation - Setting No.2). Consider Algo-
rithm 2 and Algorithm 3.
For convex f , use Theorem 12 and Theorem 13.
(1) No acceleration: Both the bounds for low-rank and group-
sparse estimators achieve their respective minimums w.r.t. α at α = 0.
Meanwhile, φ(α) = 2/5.
(2) Accelerated: Both the bounds for low-rank and group-sparse
estimators achieve their respective minimums w.r.t. α at α = 2/5.
Meanwhile, φ(α) = 4/9.
For strongly convex f , use Theorem 14 and Theorem 15.
(1) No acceleration: Both the bounds for low-rank and group-
sparse estimators achieve their respective minimums w.r.t. Q at Q =
Q
2/5
0 . Meanwhile, logψ(Q,Q20)Q0 = 1/2.
(2) Accelerated: Both the bounds for low-rank and group-
sparse estimators achieve their respective minimums w.r.t. Q at
Q = (Q′0)
1/5. Meanwhile, logψ(Q,Q′0)Q
′
0 = 1.
Proof. It is the corollaries of Theorem 6, replacing the term√
log(e+ /δ) with the term
√
log(1/δ) by Lemma 9.
APPENDIX D
VARYING TRAINING-DATA PERCENTAGE
Since the MTL behavior may change when the training-data
percentage (the size of the training data divided by the size
of the entire dataset) changes, we evaluated the methods on
both real-world datasets at different training-data percentages.
Here, we present the results mostly for our low-rank algorithm
(denoted by MP-MTL-LR) because it always outperforms our
group-sparse algorithm (MP-MTL-GS) in the above experi-
ments. The results corresponding to School Data are shown in
Fig. 11; the results corresponding to LSOA II Data are shown in
Fig. 12. From those plots, we observe that on both real-world
datasets, our MP-MTL method behaves similarly at different
training-data percentages and outperforms DP-MTRL and DP-
AGGR, especially when  is small.
APPENDIX E
PROPERTIES OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
• Post-Processing immunity. This property helps us safely
use the output of a differentially private algorithm
without additional information leaking, as long as we
do not touch the dataset D again.
Property 1 (Post-Processing immunity. Proposition 2.1
in Dwork et al. [23]). Let algorithmA1(B1) : D → θ1 ∈ C1
be an (, δ) - differential privacy algorithm, and let f : C1 →
C2 be an arbitrary mapping. Then, algorithm A2(B2) : D →
θ2 ∈ C2 is still (, δ) - differentially private, i.e., for any set
S ⊆ C2,
P(θ2 ∈ S | B2 = D) ≤ eP(θ2 ∈ S | B2 = D′) + δ.
• Group privacy. This property guarantees the graceful
increment of the privacy budget when more output
variables need differentially private protection.
Property 2 (Group privacy. Lemma 2.2 in Vadhan [67]).
Let algorithm A(B) : D → θ ∈ C be an (, δ) - differen-
tial privacy algorithm. Then, considering two neighboring
datasets D and D′ that differ in k entries, the algorithm
satisfies for any set S ⊆ C
P(θ ∈ S | B = D) ≤ ekP(θ ∈ S | B = D′) + kekδ.
• Composition. This property guarantees the linear incre-
menting of the privacy budget when the dataset D is
repeatedly used.
Property 3 (Composition. Theorem 3.16 in Dwork et al.
[23]). Let algorithm Ai : D → θi ∈ Ci be an (i, δi)
(a) 30% - Fine scale (b) 30% - Coarse scale
(c) 50% - Fine scale (d) 50% - Coarse scale
(e) 70% - Fine scale (f) 70% - Coarse scale
(g) 90% - Fine scale (h) 90% - Coarse scale
Figure 11. Privacy-accuracy tradeoff on School Data. (a) and (b) corre-
spond to a training-data percentage of 30%, (c) and (d) correspond to a
training-data percentage of 50%, (e) and (f) correspond to a training-
data percentage of 70%, (g) and (h) correspond to a training-data
percentage of 90%. (a), (c), (e) and (g) use fine scales of vertical axes
to focus on the performances of our algorithms; (b), (d), (f) and (h) use
coarse scales of vertical axes to focus on the baseline algorithms. In all
the panels, MTL denotes the method with the best performance among
the four non-private MTL methods proposed by Ji and Ye [39], Liu et al.
[49], Zhang and Yeung [77] and DP-AGGR without perturbations; MP-
MTL-LR denotes Algorithm 2, whereas MP-MTL-GS denotes Algorithm
3; STL denotes the method with the better performance between the `1-
and `2-regularized methods.
- differential privacy algorithm for all i ∈ [k]. Then,
A[k] : D → (θ1, θ2, · · · , θk) ∈
⊗k
j=1 Cj is a (
∑
i i,
∑
i δi)
- differentially private algorithm.
• Adaptive composition. This property guarantees pri-
vacy when an iterative algorithm is adopted on differ-
ent datasets that may nevertheless contain information
relating to the same individual.
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(a) 30% - Fine scale (b) 30% - Coarse scale
(c) 50% - Fine scale (d) 50% - Coarse scale
(e) 70% - Fine scale (f) 70% - Coarse scale
(g) 90% - Fine scale (h) 90% - Coarse scale
Figure 12. Privacy-accuracy tradeoff on LSOA II Data. (a) and (b)
correspond to a training-data percentage of 30%, (c) and (d) correspond
to a training-data percentage of 50%, (e) and (f) correspond to a training-
data percentage of 70%, (g) and (h) correspond to a training-data
percentage of 90%. (a), (c), (e) and (g) use fine scales of vertical axes
to focus on the performances of our algorithms; (b), (d), (f) and (h) use
coarse scales of vertical axes to focus on the baseline algorithms. In all
the panels, MTL denotes the method with the best performance among
the four non-private MTL methods proposed by Ji and Ye [39], Liu et al.
[49], Zhang and Yeung [77] and DP-AGGR without perturbations; MP-
MTL-LR denotes Algorithm 2, whereas MP-MTL-GS denotes Algorithm
3; STL denotes the method with the better performance between the `1-
and `2-regularized methods.
Property 4 (Adaptive composition. Directly taken The-
orem 3.5 in Kairouz et al. [42]). Let algorithm A1(B1) :
D1 → θ1 be an (1, δ1) - differential privacy algorithm, and
for t = 2, . . . , T , letAt(Bt) : (Dt, θ1, θ2, · · · , θt−1)→ θt ∈
Ct be (t, δt) - differentially private for all given
(θ1, θ2, · · · , θt−1) ∈ ⊗t−1t′=1 Ct′ . Then, for all neighboring
datasets Dt and D′t that differ in a single entry relating to the
same individual and for any set S ⊆⊗Tt=1 Ct,
P((θ1, · · · , θT ) ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (Dt,θ1:t−1)))
≤eP((θ1, · · · , θT ) ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (D′t,θ1:t−1)))
+ 1− (1− δ)
T∏
t=1
(1− δt),
(44)
where
θ1:t−1 =
{ ∅, t = 1
θ1, θ2, · · · , θt−1, t ≥ 2,
and
 = min
{ T∑
t=1
t,
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
1
δ
)
,
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
t
δ
)}
.
APPENDIX F
LEMMAS FOR UTILITY ANALYSIS
Lemma 3. For a integer T ≥ 1, a constant α ∈ R, by EulerMaclau-
rin formula [5], we have
T∑
t=1
tα =
{
O(Tα+1/(α+ 1)), α > −1;
O(1/(−α− 1)), α < −1.
Proof. This is the direct result of EulerMaclaurin formula [5].
Lemma 4. For a integer T ≥ 1 and a constant Q > 0, we have
T∑
t=1
Q−t ≤
{
1
Q−1 , Q > 1;
Q−T
1−Q , Q < 1.
Proof. Because
∑T
t=1Q
−t = Q−1 1−Q
−T
1−Q−1 , we complete the
proof.
Lemma 5. For constants c1, c2 > 0, a constant 0 > 0, a integer
T ≥ 1, a mapping s : t ∈ [T ] → s(t) > 0, a mapping S1 :
T → S1(T ) > 0 and a mapping S2 : T → S2(T ) > 0, then if∑T
t=1 0s(t) ≥ c1 and
∑T
t=1 s(t) ≤ S1(T ), we have
1/0 ≤ S1(T )/c1.
On the other hand, if
√∑T
t=1 
2
0s
2(t) ≥ c2 and ∑Tt=1 s2(t) ≤
S2(T ), we have
1/0 ≤
√
S2(T )/c2.
Proof. If
∑T
t=1 0s(t) ≥ c1, 1/0 ≤
∑T
t=1 s(t)/c1 ≤ S1(T )/c1.
On the other hand, if
√∑T
t=1 
2
0s
2(t) ≥ c2, 1/0 ≤√∑T
t=1 s
2(t)/c2 ≤
√
S2(T )/c2.
Lemma 6. Consider Algorithm 2. For an index k ≤ q that suffices
the definition in Lemma 1 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L, λ = Θ(LK√m),
set t ≤ 4Kk2d(log d)/q2 for t ∈ [T ]. Assume in each iteration, E is
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the defined Wishart random matrix. We have with probability at least
1− d−c for some constant c > 1 that
εt =
1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖∗
−
{
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖∗
}
=O
(
K3
√
mkd log d
ηt
)
.
(45)
Proof. First, using Lemma 1 of Jiang et al. [41], we have in the
t-th step, with probability at least 1 − d−c for some constant
c > 1,
σ1(E) = O
(
d(log d)σ1
(
K2
2t
Id
))
= O(d(log d)K2/t).
We also have σ1(C) ≤ ‖C‖F ≤ √mmaxi ‖Ci‖2 ≤ K√m,
where Ci is the i-th column of C.
As such, by Lemma 1, in the t-th iteration, for t ≤
4Kk2d(log d)/q2, where q = min{d,m}, we have
εt =
1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖∗
−
{
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖∗
}
≤1
η
(
σ21(C)
ηλ
+ σ1(C)
)[
k
σ1(E)
2ηλ
+ (rc − k)I(rc > k)
√
σ1(E) +
(
k(k − 1)
ηλ
+ 2k
)
σ1(E)
]
≤1
η
(
K2m
ηλ
+K
√
m
)[
k
σ1(E)
2ηλ
+ q
√
σ1(E) +
(
k(k − 1)
ηλ
+ 2k
)
σ1(E)
]
=O
(
1
η
(
K2m
ηλ
+K
√
m
)(
k2
ηλ
+ 2k
)
d(log d)K2
t
)
,
where in the second inequality, the terms with σ1(E) dominate
due to the condition on t.
Further assuming η = 1/L and λ = Θ(LK
√
m), we com-
plete the proof.
Lemma 7. Consider Algorithm 3. For an index k ≤ d that
suffices the definition in Lemma 2 for all t ∈ [T ], η = 1/L,
λ = Θ(LKd
√
m), set t ≤ k2 log(d)/4Kd(d− k)2m for t ∈ [T ].
Assume in each iteration, E is the defined Wishart random matrix.
We have with probability at least 1 − d−c for some constant c > 1
that
εt =
1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖2,1
−
{
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖2,1
}
=O
(
K2k log d
ηt
)
.
(46)
Proof. Similarly as in proof for Lemma 6, by Lemma 2, in the
t-th iteration, we have
εt =
1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖2,1
−
{
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖2,1
}
≤1
η
[
rc,s
ηλ
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)2
+
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)]
·
[
k
2ηλ
max
j:η2λ2≤Σjj,0
|Ejj |
+ (rc,s − k)I(rc,s > k) max
j:η2λ2>Σjj,0
√
|Ejj |
]
≤1
η
[
rc,s
ηλ
‖C‖2F + ‖C‖F
]
·
[
k
2ηλ
σ1(E) + (rc,s − k)I(rc,s > k)
√
σ1(E)
]
≤1
η
(
dK2m
ηλ
+K
√
m
)[
k
σ1(E)
2ηλ
+ (d− k)
√
σ1(E)
]
.
Further setting η = 1/L and λ = Θ(LKd
√
m), assuming t ≤
k2 log(d)/4Kd(d− k)2m, we have
εt =O
(
1
η
(
dK2m
ηλ
+K
√
m
)
k
ηλ
d(log d)K2
t
)
=O
(
K2k log d
ηt
)
.
(47)
Lemma 8. For matrices W1,W2 ∈ W ⊂ Rd×m, we have
‖W1 −W2‖F = O(K
√
m).
Proof. Because W1,W2 ∈ W , maxi∈[m] ‖wi,1‖2 ≤ K. There-
fore,
‖W1 −W2‖F ≤ 2‖W1‖F ≤ 2
√
m max
i∈[m]
‖wi,1‖2 ≤ 2K
√
m.
Lemma 9. For constants , δ ≥ 0, a integer T ≥ 1, a series constants
t > 0 for t ∈ [T ], then if
 =
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
1
δ
)
,
we have √√√√ T∑
t=1
2t ≥
√
2
2
√
log(1/δ) + 2
.
On the other hand, if
 =
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
t
δ
)
,
we have√√√√ T∑
t=1
2t ≥ max
{√

1 +
√
2/(eδ)
,
√
2
2
√
log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2
}
.
Proof. If  =
∑T
t=1
(et−1)t
(et+1)
+
√∑T
t=1 2
2
t log
(
1
δ
)
,
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Because (ex − 1)/(ex + 1) ≤ x for x ≥ 0, then
 ≤
T∑
t=1
2t +
√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
1
δ
)
.
Solving the inequality with respect to
√∑T
t=1 
2
t , we get√√√√ T∑
t=1
2t ≥
√
2√
log(1/δ) + 2+
√
log(1/δ)
≥
√
2
2
√
log(1/δ) + 2
.
If we have
 =
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
t
δ
)
. (48)
Because (ex − 1)/(ex + 1) ≤ x for x ≥ 0, then
 ≤
T∑
t=1
2t +
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
t
δ
)
≤
T∑
t=1
2t +
√
2
∑T
t=1 
2
t
eδ
,
where the second inequality is because log(e+ x) ≤ x/e+ 1 for
x ≥ 0.
As such, √√√√ T∑
t=1
2t ≥
√

1 +
√
2/(eδ)
.
On the other hand, by (48), it also holds that
√
2
√∑T
t=1 
2
t ≤
. Then we have
 ≤
T∑
t=1
2t +
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
t
δ
)
≤
T∑
t=1
2t +
√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√
2δ
)
.
Solving the inequality with respect to
√∑T
t=1 
2
t , we also get√√√√ T∑
t=1
2t ≥
√
2√
log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2+
√
log(e+ /
√
2δ)
≥
√
2
2
√
log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2
.
Lemma 10. For constants κ, 0 > 0, c1, c2 > 0, α ∈ R, a integer
T ≥ 1, assuming t = 0tα, εt = O(κ/t) for t ∈ [T ], if ∑Tt=1 t ≥
c1, we have
T∑
t=1
√
εt =

O
(√
κTα+1
c1(α/2−1)2(α+1)
)
, α > 2;
O
(√
κT3
c1(α/2−1)2(α+1)
)
, −1 < α < 2;
O
(√
κT2−α
c1(α/2−1)2(−α−1)
)
, α < −1,
and
T∑
t=1
t
√
εt =

O
(√
κTα+1
c1(α/2−2)2(α+1)
)
, α > 4;
O
(√
κT5
c1(α/2−2)2(α+1)
)
, −1 < α < 4;
O
(√
κT4−α
c1(α/2−2)2(−α−1)
)
, α < −1.
If
√∑T
t=1 
2
t ≥ c2, we have
T∑
t=1
√
εt =

O
(√
κTα+1/2
c2(α/2−1)2
√
2α+1
)
, α > 2;
O
(√
κT5/2
c2(α/2−1)2
√
2α+1
)
, −1/2 < α < 2;
O
(√
κT2−α
c2(α/2−1)2
√−2α−1
)
, α < −1/2,
and
T∑
t=1
t
√
εt =

O
(√
κTα+1/2
c2(α/2−2)2
√
2α+1
)
, α > 4;
O
(√
κT9/2
c2(α/2−2)2
√
2α+1
)
, −1/2 < α < 4;
O
(√
κT4−α
c2(α/2−2)2
√−2α−1
)
, α < −1/2.
Proof. If
∑T
t=1 t =
∑T
t=1 0t
α ≥ c1. We have
T∑
t=1
√
εt = O
( T∑
t=1
√
κ/t
)
= O
( T∑
t=1
√
κ
0tα
)
= O
( T∑
t=1
t−α/2
√
κ
0
)
.
Using Lemma 5, we have
T∑
t=1
√
εt = O
( T∑
t=1
t−α/2
√√√√ κ
c1
T∑
t=1
tα
)
.
Then using Lemma 3, if α > 2, i.e., −α/2 < −1, we have
T∑
t=1
√
εt = O
(
1
−(−α/2)− 1
√
κ
c1
Tα+1
α+ 1
)
= O
(√
κ
c1
Tα+1
(α/2− 1)2(α+ 1)
)
.
Results under other conditions can be proved similarly.
Lemma 11. For constants κ, 0 > 0, c1, c2 > 0, Q0 ∈ (0, 1),
Q > 0, a integer T ≥ 1, assuming t = 0Q−t, εt = O(κ/t) for
t ∈ [T ], if ∑Tt=1 t ≥ c1, we have
T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
εt =

O
(√
κQ−T
c1(Q0/
√
Q−1)2(1−Q)
)
, 0 < Q < Q20;
O
(√
κ(Q20)
−T
c1(Q0/
√
Q−1)2(1−Q)
)
, Q20 < Q < 1;
O
(√
κ(Q20/Q)
−T
c1(Q0/
√
Q−1)2(Q−1)
)
, Q > 1,
and
T∑
t=1
√
εtQ
−t
0 =

O
(√
κQ−T
c1(
√
Q0/
√
Q−1)2(1−Q)
)
, 0 < Q < Q0;
O
(√
κQ−T0
c1(
√
Q0/
√
Q−1)2(1−Q)
)
, Q0 < Q < 1;
O
(√
κ(Q0/Q)−T
c1(
√
Q0/
√
Q−1)2(Q−1)
)
, Q > 1.
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If
√∑T
t=1 
2
t ≥ c2, we have
T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
εt =

O
(√
κQ−T
c2(Q0/
√
Q−1)2
√
1−Q2
)
, 0 < Q < Q20;
O
(√
κ(Q20)
−T
c2(Q0/
√
Q−1)2
√
1−Q2
)
, Q20 < Q < 1;
O
(√
κ(Q20/Q)
−T
c2(Q0/
√
Q−1)2
√
Q2−1
)
, Q > 1,
and
T∑
t=1
√
εtQ
−t
0 =

O
(√
κQ−T
c2(
√
Q0/
√
Q−1)2
√
1−Q2
)
, 0 < Q < Q0;
O
(√
κQ−T0
c2(
√
Q0/
√
Q−1)2
√
1−Q2
)
, Q0 < Q < 1;
O
(√
κ(Q0/Q)−T
c2(
√
Q0/
√
Q−1)2
√
Q2−1
)
, Q > 1.
Proof. If
∑T
t=1 t =
∑T
t=1 0Q
−t ≥ c1. We have
T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
εt = O
( T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
κ/t
)
= O
( T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
κ
0Q−t
)
= O
( T∑
t=1
(Q0/
√
Q)−t
√
κ
0
)
.
Using Lemma 5, we have
T∑
t=1
√
εt = O
( T∑
t=1
(Q0/
√
Q)−t
√√√√ κ
c1
T∑
t=1
Q−t
)
.
Then using Lemma 4, if Q < Q20 < 1, i.e., Q0/
√
Q > 1, we
have
T∑
t=1
√
εt = O
(
1
Q0/
√
Q− 1
√
κ
c1
Q−T
1−Q
)
= O
(√
κQ−T
c1(Q0/
√
Q− 1)2(1−Q)
)
.
Results under other conditions can be proved similarly.
Lemma 12. For constants L, c3, c4 > 0, a integer T ≥ 1,
matrices W˜(0),W∗ ∈ W ⊂ Rd×m, if it holds for a series of
positive constants {εt} that ∑Tt=1√εt = O(√c4T c3), setting
T = Θ((K2Lm/c4)
1/c3), we have
E = L
2mT
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F + 2
T∑
t=1
√
2εt
L
+
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
εt
L
)2
= O
(
K2L
[
c4
K2Lm
]1/c3)
.
Proof. First, because εt > 0 for t ∈ [T ], we have√√√√ T∑
t=1
εt ≤
T∑
t=1
√
εt.
Then combining Lemma 8 and Lemma 3, it suffices that
E = O
(
L
mT
[
K
√
m+
1√
L
T∑
t=1
√
εt
]2)
= O
([
K
√
L
T
+
1√
mT
T∑
t=1
√
εt
]2)
= O
([
K
√
L
T
+
1√
mT
√
c4T c3
]2)
.
Then setting T = Θ((K2Lm/c4)1/c3), we complete the proof.
Lemma 13. For constants L, c3, c4 > 0, a integer T ≥ 1,
matrices W˜(0),W∗ ∈ W ⊂ Rd×m, if it holds for a series of
positive constants {εt} that ∑Tt=1√εt = O(√c4T c3), setting
T = Θ((K2Lm/c4)
1/c3), we have
E = 2L
m(T + 1)2
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F
+ 2
T∑
t=1
t
√
2εt
L
+
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
t2
εt
L
)2
=O
(
K2L
[
c4
K2Lm
]2/c3)
.
Proof. First, because εt > 0 for t ∈ [T ], we have√√√√ T∑
t=1
t2εt ≤
T∑
t=1
√
t2εt =
T∑
t=1
t
√
εt.
Then combining Lemma 8 and Lemma 3, it suffices that
E = O
(
L
mT 2
[
K
√
m+
1√
L
T∑
t=1
t
√
εt
]2)
= O
([
K
√
L
T
+
1√
mT
T∑
t=1
t
√
εt
]2)
= O
([
K
√
L
T
+
1√
mT
√
c4T c3
]2)
.
Then setting T = Θ((K2Lm/c4)1/c3), we complete the proof.
Lemma 14. For constants L, c6 > 0, a constant c5 ∈
(0, 1), a constant Q0 ∈ (0, 1), a integer T ≥ 1, matrices
W˜(0),W∗ ∈ W ⊂ Rd×m, if it holds for a series of positive
constants {εt} that ∑Tt=1Q−t0 √εt = O(√c6c5−T ), setting T =
Θ(log1/c5(K
2Lm/c6)), we have
E = Q
T
0√
m
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F + 2
T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
2εt
L
)
= O
(
K
[
c6
K2Lm
]logc5 Q0)
.
Proof. Using Lemma 8 and Lemma 4, it suffices that
E = O
(
QT0√
m
[
K
√
m+
1√
L
T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
εt
])
= O
(
QT0
[
K +
1√
mL
T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
εt
])
= O
(
QT0
[
K +
1√
mL
√
c6c5−T
])
.
Then setting T = Θ(log1/c5(K
2Lm/c6)), we complete the
proof.
Lemma 15. For constants L, µ, c6 > 0, a constant c5 ∈ (0, 1),
a constant Q0 ∈ (0, 1), a integer T ≥ 1, matrices W˜(0),W∗ ∈
W ⊂ Rd×m, if it holds for a series of positive constants {εt} that
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t=1
√
εtQ
−t
0 = O(
√
c6c5−T ), setting T = Θ((K2Lm/c4)1/c3),
we have
E =(Q0)
T
m
(
K
√
Lm+ 2
√
L
µ
T∑
t=1
√
εt(Q0)−t
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
εt(Q0)−t
)2
=O
(
K2L
[
c6
K2µm
]logc5 Q0)
.
Proof. First, because εt > 0 for t ∈ [T ], we have√√√√ T∑
t=1
εtQ
−t
0 ≤
T∑
t=1
√
εtQ
−t
0 .
Then using Lemma 8 and Lemma 4, it suffices that
E = O
(
QT0
m
[
K
√
Lm+
√
L
µ
T∑
t=1
√
εtQ
−t
0
]2)
= O
(
QT0
[
K
√
L+
√
L
mµ
T∑
t=1
√
εtQ
−t
0
]2)
= O
(
QT0
[
K
√
L+
√
L
mµ
√
c6c5−T
]2)
.
Then setting T = Θ(log1/c5(K
2µm/c6)), we complete the proof.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF RESULTS IN THE MAIN TEXT
G.1 Proof of Claim 1
Proof. Under the setting of single-task learning, each task is
learned independently, and thus, using the notations in Defi-
nition 6, we have for i = 1, . . . ,m, for any set S,
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1),Dm,θ1:t−1))
= P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1)[−i] ,D[−i],θ1:t−1)).
As such, we have for i = 1, . . . ,m,
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
⋂T
t=1 Bt = (W(t−1),Dm,θ1:t−1))
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
⋂T
t=1 Bt = ((W′)(t−1), (D′)m,θ1:t−1))
=
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
⋂T
t=1 Bt = (W(t−1)[−i] ,D[−i],θ1:t−1))
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
⋂T
t=1 Bt = (W(t−1)[−i] ,D[−i],θ1:t−1))
= 1 ≤ e0.
G.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First, for Algorithm 2, denoting Σ0 = Σ˜
(t)
, the j-th
diagonal element of Sηλ is
max
(
0, 1− ηλ√
σj(Σ0 + E)
)
≥max
(
0, 1− ηλ√
σj(Σ0) + σd(E)
)
,
where σd(E) is the d-th largest singular value, i.e., the smallest
singular value, of E. As such, when σd(E) = Cλ2 for suffi-
ciently large C > 0, max
(
0, 1− ηλ√
σj(Σ0)+σd(E)
)
→ 1.
Then wˆ(t−1)i = USηλU
Tw
(t−1)
i = UU
Tw
(t−1)
i = w
(t−1)
i .
Therefore, all the procedures can be decoupled to indepen-
dently run for each task, thus Algorithm 2 degrades to an STL
algorithm with no random perturbation.
Similarly, for Algorithm 3, for all j ∈ [m], the j-th diagonal
element of Sηλ is
max
(
0, 1− ηλ√|Σjj,0 + Ejj |
)
= max
(
0, 1− ηλ√
Σjj,0 + Ejj
)
,
where the equality is because Σ0 is semi-positive definite and
E is positive definite.
As such, when minj Ejj = Cλ2 for sufficiently large C > 0,
minj
[
max
(
0, 1− ηλ√
Σjj,0+Ejj
)]
→ 1.
Then wˆ(t−1)i = Sηλw
(t−1)
i = w
(t−1)
i . Therefore, all the
procedures can be decoupled to independently run for each
task, thus Algorithm 3 degrades to an STL algorithm with no
random perturbation.
G.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For simplicity, we omit the symbol B used to denote the
input in the conditional events in some equations.
First, we show that for all t ∈ [T ], the mapping W(t−1) →
Σ(t) is an (t, 0)-differentially private algorithm.
Case 1. For Σ(t) = Σ˜
(t)
+E = W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T+E, we follow
the proof of Theorem 4 of Jiang et al. [41].
For all i ∈ [m], consider two adjacent parameter matrices
W˜(t−1) and (W˜′)(t−1) that differ only in the i-th column such
that W˜(t−1) = [w˜(t−1)1 · · · w˜(t−1)i · · · w˜(t−1)m ] and (W˜′)(t−1) =
[w˜
(t−1)
1 · · · (w˜′i)(t−1) · · · w˜(t−1)m ]. Now, let
Σ˜
(t)
= W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T =
m∑
j=1
w˜
(t−1)
j (w˜
(t−1)
j )
T
(Σ˜
′
)(t) = (W˜′)(t−1)((W˜′)(t−1))T
=
∑
j∈[m],j 6=i
w˜
(t−1)
j (w˜
(t−1)
j )
T + (w˜′i)
(t−1)((w˜′i)
(t−1))T
∆ = Σ˜
(t) − (Σ˜′)(t)
= w˜
(t−1)
i (w˜
(t−1)
i )
T − (w˜′i)(t−1)((w˜′i)(t−1))T.
Then, we have for the conditional densities
p(Σ(t) | W˜(t−1))
p(Σ(t) | (W˜′)(t−1))
=
p(Σ(t) = W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T + E1)
p(Σ(t) = (W˜′)(t−1)((W˜′)(t−1))T + E2)
.
Because E1,E2 ∼ WD(D + 1, K22t ID), letting V = K
2
2t
ID ,
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α = K
2
2t
,
p(Σ(t) = W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T + E1)
p(Σ(t) = (W˜′)(t−1)((W˜′)(t−1))T + E2)
=
exp[−tr(V−1(Σ(t) − W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T))/2]
exp[−tr(V−1(Σ(t) − (W˜′)(t−1)((W˜′)(t−1))T))/2]
= exp[tr(V−1(Σ(t) − (W˜′)(t−1)((W˜′)(t−1))T))/2
− tr(V−1(Σ(t) − W˜(t−1)(W˜(t−1))T))/2]
= exp[tr(V−1∆)/2]
= exp[tr(w˜(t−1)i (w˜
(t−1)
i )
T − (w˜′i)(t−1)((w˜′i)(t−1))T)/(2α)]
= exp[(tr(w˜(t−1)i (w˜
(t−1)
i )
T)− tr((w˜′i)(t−1)((w˜′i)(t−1))T))/(2α)]
= exp[(tr((w˜(t−1)i )
Tw˜
(t−1)
i )− tr(((w˜′i)(t−1))T(w˜′i)(t−1)))/(2α)]
= exp[(‖w˜(t−1)i ‖22 − ‖(w˜′i)(t−1)‖22)/(2α)]
≤ exp[‖w˜(t−1)i ‖22/(2α)] ≤ exp[K2/(2α)] = exp(t).
As such, we have
p(Σ(t) | W˜(t−1))
p(Σ(t) | (W˜′)(t−1))
≤ exp(t).
Case 2. Consider Σ(t) = Σ˜
(t)
+ E = (W˜(t−1))TW˜(t−1) + E.
For all i ∈ [m], consider two adjacent parameter matrices
W˜(t−1) and (W˜′)(t−1) that differ only in the i-th column such
that W˜(t−1) = [w˜(t−1)1 · · · w˜(t−1)i · · · w˜(t−1)m ] and (W˜′)(t−1) =
[w˜
(t−1)
1 · · · (w˜′i)(t−1) · · · w˜(t−1)m ]. Let
Σ˜
(t)
= (W˜(t−1))TW˜(t−1)
(Σ˜
′
)(t) = ((W˜′)(t−1))T(W˜′)(t−1)
∆ = Σ˜
(t) − (Σ˜′)(t),
where the i-th diagonal element of ∆ is ‖w˜(t−1)i ‖22 −
‖(w˜′i)(t−1)‖22 and the other diagonal elements of ∆ are zeros.
Then, we have
p(Σ(t) | W˜(t−1))
p(Σ(t) | (W˜′)(t−1))
=
p(Σ(t) = (W˜(t−1))TW˜(t−1) + E1)
p(Σ(t) = ((W˜′)(t−1))T(W˜′)(t−1) + E2)
.
Because E1,E2 ∼Wm(m+ 1, K22t Im), letting V = K
2
2t
Im,
p(Σ(t) = (W˜(t−1))TW˜(t−1) + E1)
p(Σ(t) = ((W˜′)(t−1))T(W˜′)(t−1) + E2)
=
exp[−tr(V−1(Σ(t) − (W˜(t−1))TW˜(t−1)))/2]
exp[−tr(V−1(Σ(t) − ((W˜′)(t−1))T(W˜′)(t−1)))/2]
= exp[tr(V−1(Σ(t) − ((W˜′)(t−1))T(W˜′)(t−1)))/2
− tr(V−1(Σ(t) − (W˜(t−1))TW˜(t−1)))/2]
= exp[tr(V−1∆)/2]
= exp[(‖w˜(t−1)i ‖22 − ‖(w˜′i)(t−1)‖22)/(2vii)]
≤ exp[‖w˜(t−1)i ‖22/(2vii)] ≤ exp[K2/(2vii)] = exp(t).
As such, we also have
p(Σ(t) | W˜(t−1))
p(Σ(t) | (W˜′)(t−1))
≤ exp(t).
Because the norm clipping is a deterministic STL algorithm
and because the mapping W˜(t−1) → Σ(t) is an (t, 0) - differ-
entially private algorithm, we have for any set S ⊆ Rd×d that
P(Σ(t) ∈ S | w(t−1)[−i] ,w(t−1)i )
=P(Σ(t) ∈ S | w˜(t−1)[−i] , w˜(t−1)i )
≤etP(Σ(t) ∈ S | w˜(t−1)[−i] , (w˜′i)(t−1))
=etP(Σ(t) ∈ S | w(t−1)[−i] , (w′i)(t−1)),
which renders the mapping W(t−1) → Σ(t) as an (t, 0) -
differentially private algorithm as well.
Next, given t ∈ [T ], Σ(1:t−1) (when t = 1, Σ(1:t−1) = ∅) and
the mapping f : Σ(1:t) → M(t), which does not touch any
unperturbed sensitive information, using the Post-Processing
immunity property (Property 1) for the mapping f ′ : Σ(1:t) →
(M(t),Σ(t)), the algorithm (W(t−1),Σ(1:t−1))→ (M(t),Σ(t)) is
still an (t, 0)-differentially private algorithm.
Then, because wˆ(t)i = Ast,i(M(t), w˜(0:t−1)i ,Xi,yi) is
an STL algorithm for the i-th task, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
the mapping (M(t), w˜(0:t−1)[−i] ,X[−i],y[−i]) → (wˆ(t)[−i])
thus does not touch any unperturbed sensitive
information for the i-th task. As such, applying the Post-
Processing immunity Lemma again for the mapping f ′′ :
(M(t), w˜
(0:t−1)
[−i] ,X[−i],y[−i],Σ
(1:t−1)) → (wˆ(t)[−i],M(t),Σ(t)),
for the algorithm (W(t−1),Σ(1:t−1),w(0:t−2)[−i] ,X[−i],y[−i]) →
(wˆ
(t)
[−i],M
(t),Σ(t)) (when t = 1, w(0:t−2)[−i] = ∅), denoting
ϑt,i = (wˆ
(t)
[−i],M
(t),Σ(t)) ∈ Ct,i , we have for any set St,i ⊆ Ct,i
P(ϑt,i ∈ St,i |W(t−1),Σ(1:t−1), w˜(0:t−2)[−i] ,Dm)
≤etP(ϑt,i ∈ St,i | (W′)(t−1),Σ(1:t−1), w˜(0:t−2)[−i] , (D′)m),
where W(t−1) and (W′)(t−1) differ only in the i-th column and
Dm and (D′)m differ only in the i-th task.
Now, again, for t = 1, . . . , T , we take the t-th dataset D˜t =
{(w(t−1)1 ,D1), . . . , (w(t−1)m ,Dm)}. Given that W(t) = Ŵ(t) for
all t ∈ [T ], we have for any set St,i ⊆ Ct,i that
P(ϑt,i ∈ St,i | D˜t,ϑ1:t−1)
≤etP(ϑt,i ∈ St,i | D˜′t,ϑ1:t−1),
where D˜t and D˜′t are two adjacent datasets that differ in a single
entry, the i-th data instance (w(t−1)i ,Di = (Xi,yi)), and
ϑ1:t−1 =
{ ∅, t = 1
(ϑ1,1, . . . , ϑ1,m) . . . , (ϑt−1,1, . . . , ϑt−1,m), t ≥ 2.
This renders the algorithm in the t-th iteration an (t, 0)-
differentially private algorithm.
Now, again by the Adaptive composition property (Property
4), for all i ∈ [m] and for any set S ′ ⊆⊗Tt=1 Cti , we have
P((ϑ1,i, · · · , ϑT,i) ∈ S ′ |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (D˜t,ϑ1:t−1)))
≤e˜P((ϑ1,i, · · · , ϑT,i) ∈ S ′ |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (D˜′t,ϑ1:t−1)))
+ δ,
where for all t ∈ [T ], Bt denotes the input for the t-th iteration.
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Finally, taking θt = (ϑt,1, . . . , ϑt,m) for all t ∈ [T ], we have
for any set S ⊆ Rd×(m−1)×T
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1),Dm,θ1:t−1))
≤eP(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = ((W′)(t−1), (D′)m,θ1:t−1))
+ δ,
G.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. For simplicity, we omit the symbol B used to denote the
input in the conditional events in some equations.
Using Theorem 1, we only need to show that Algorithm 2
complies with our MP-MTL framework in Algorithm 1.
Let M(t) = USηλUT. As such, the 6-th step to the 9-th step
can be treated as the process of first performing a mapping
f : Σ(1:t) →M(t) and then applying an STL algorithm:
wˆ
(t)
i = USηλU
Tw˜
(t−1)
i , for all i ∈ [m]. (49)
Now, because (49), the 10-th step and the 11-th step are
all STL algorithms, they can be treated as a entire STL al-
gorithm performing the mapping: (M(t), w˜(0:t−1)i ,Xi,yi) →
(wˆ
(t)
i , w˜
(t)
i ).
As such, in all the iterations, Algorithm 2 complies with
Algorithm 1. Thus, the result of Theorem 1 can be applied to
Algorithm 2.
Similarly, using Theorem 1, we only need to show that Al-
gorithm 3 complies with our MP-MTL framework in Algorithm
1.
The proof for the sensitivity is the same.
Now, let M(t) = Sηλ. As such, the 6-th step can be treated
as a mapping f : Σ(1:t) →M(t).
Then, because the 8-th step, the 9-th step and the 10-th
step are all STL algorithms, they can be treated as a entire STL
algorithm performing the mapping: (M(t), w˜(0:t−1)i ,Xi,yi) →
(wˆ
(t)
i , w˜
(t)
i ).
Therefore, in all the iterations, Algorithm 3 complies with
Algorithm 1, and thus, the result of Theorem 1 can be applied
to Algorithm 3.
G.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We invoke the results of Schmidt et al. [60] to bound the
empirical optimization error.
In the t-th step, a standard proximal operator (see Ji and Ye
[39]) optimizes the following problem:
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖∗,
where C = W˜(t−1). By Theorem 3.1 of Ji and Ye [39], denote
the solution of the problem by Ŵ(t)0 = U0Sηλ,0U
T
0 C. Let
U0Λ0U
T
0 = CC
T be the SVD decomposition of CCT. Sηλ,0
is also a diagonal matrix and Sηλ,ii,0 = max{0, 1− ηλ/
√
Λii,0}
for i = 1, . . . ,min{d,m}.
By Algorithm 2, Ŵ(t) = USηλUTC.
Then we analyse the bound of 1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖∗
− { 1
2η
‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)0 ‖∗}.
First, we have
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F − ‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2F
=tr((Ŵ(t) −C)T(Ŵ(t) −C))− tr((Ŵ(t)0 −C)T(Ŵ(t)0 −C))
=tr((Ŵ(t))TŴ(t))− tr((Ŵ(t)0 )TŴ(t)0 )− 2tr((Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 )TC)
=tr((Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 )T(Ŵ(t) + Ŵ(t)0 ))− 2tr((Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 )TC)
=tr((Ŵ(t) −C)T(Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ))
+ tr((Ŵ(t)0 −C)T(Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ))
≤σ1(Ŵ(t) −C)‖Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ‖∗
+ σ1(Ŵ
(t)
0 −C)‖Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ‖∗,
(50)
where σ1(·) denotes the largest singular value of the enclosed
matrix.
Denote T = USηλUT,T0 = U0Sηλ,0UT0 . Since U is decom-
posed from a symmetric matrix, we have
σ1(Ŵ
(t) −C) = σ1(TC−C) ≤ σ1(C)σ1(T− I)
= σ1(C)σ1(USηλU
T −UUT)
= σ1(C)σ1(U(Sηλ − I)UT).
Since Sηλ− I is a diagonal matrix, whose i-th diagonal element
is max{0, 1−ηλ/√Λii}−1 ∈ [−1, 0), so σ1(U(Sηλ−I)UT) ≤ 1
and
σ1(Ŵ
(t) −C) ≤ σ1(C). (51)
Similarly,
σ1(Ŵ
(t)
0 −C) ≤ σ1(C). (52)
On the other hand,
‖Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ‖∗ = ‖TC−T0C‖∗
=
∥∥∥∥ d∑
j=1
σj(T)uju
T
j C−
d∑
j=1
σj(T0)uj,0u
T
j,0C
∥∥∥∥
∗
=
∥∥∥∥ d∑
j=1
(σj(T0) + σj(T)− σj(T0))ujuTj C
−
d∑
j=1
σj(T0)uj,0u
T
j,0C
∥∥∥∥
∗
=
∥∥∥∥ d∑
j=1
σj(T0)(uju
T
j − uj,0uTj,0)C
+
d∑
j=1
(σj(T)− σj(T0))ujuTj C
∥∥∥∥
∗
≤
∥∥∥∥ d∑
j=1
σj(T0)(uju
T
j − uj,0uTj,0)C
∥∥∥∥
∗
+
∥∥∥∥ d∑
j=1
(σj(T)− σj(T0))ujuTj C
∥∥∥∥
∗
,
(53)
where uj and uj,0 are the j-th column of U and U0, respec-
tively.
Let rc = rank(C) ≤ min{d,m} be the rank of C. Then we
have∥∥∥∥ d∑
j=1
(σj(T)− σj(T0))ujuTj C
∥∥∥∥
∗
≤
rc∑
j=1
|σj(T)− σj(T0)|σj(C) ≤ σ1(C)
rc∑
j=1
|σj(T)− σj(T0)|.
(54)
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Denote Σ0 = Σ˜
(t)
= CCT. Then we have for j ∈ [rc],
|σj(T)− σj(T0)|
=
∣∣∣∣max(0, 1− ηλ√σj(Σ0 + E)
)
−max
(
0, 1− ηλ√
σj(Σ0)
)∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣max(0, 1− ηλ√σj(Σ0) + σ1(E)
)
−max
(
0, 1− ηλ√
σj(Σ0)
)∣∣∣∣.
Case 1: ηλ >
√
σj(Σ0). Then
|σj(T)− σj(T0)|
= max
(
0, 1− ηλ√
σj(Σ0) + σ1(E)
)
≤ 1− ηλ√
η2λ2 + σ1(E)
≤1− ηλ
ηλ+
√
σ1(E)
=
√
σ1(E)
ηλ+
√
σ1(E)
≤
√
σ1(E)
ηλ
Case 2: ηλ ≤√σj(Σ0). Then
|σj(T)− σj(T0)|
=1− ηλ√
σj(Σ0) + σ1(E)
− 1 + ηλ√
σj(Σ0)
=ηλ ·
√
σj(Σ0) + σ1(E)−
√
σj(Σ0)√
σ2j (Σ0) + σj(Σ0)σ1(E)
=
ηλσ1(E)
[
√
σj(Σ0) + σ1(E) +
√
σj(Σ0)]
√
σ2j (Σ0) + σj(Σ0)σ1(E)
≤ ηλσ1(E)
[
√
η2λ2 + 0 +
√
η2λ2]
√
η4λ4 + 0
=
σ1(E)
2η2λ2
.
Suppose that there exists an index k ≤ d such that
σ2k(C) = σk(Σ0) > η
2λ2, σ2k+1(C) = σk+1(Σ0) ≤ η2λ2,
then σj(T0) > 0 for j ≤ k, k ≤ rc, and
rc∑
j=1
|σj(T)− σj(T0)|
≤kσ1(E)
2η2λ2
+ (rc − k)I(rc > k)
√
σ1(E)
ηλ
.
(55)
For another part of (53),
∥∥∥∥ d∑
j=1
σj(T0)(uju
T
j − uj,0uTj,0)C
∥∥∥∥
∗
=
∥∥∥∥ k∑
j=1
σj(T0)(uju
T
j − uj,0uTj,0)C
∥∥∥∥
∗
≤σ1(C)
∥∥∥∥ k∑
j=1
σj(T0)(uju
T
j − uj,0uTj,0)
∥∥∥∥
∗
.
(56)
Denote Uj =
∑j
j′=1 uj′uj′ ,Uj,0 =
∑j
j′=1 uj′,0uj′,0 for j ∈
[d]. Let U0 = U0,0 = 0. Then ujuj = Uj − Uj−1,uj,0uj,0 =
Uj,0 −Uj−1,0 for j ∈ [d].
Then we have∥∥∥∥ k∑
j=1
σj(T0)(uju
T
j − uj,0uTj,0)
∥∥∥∥
∗
=
∥∥∥∥ k∑
j=1
σj(T0)(Uj −Uj,0 − (Uj−1 −Uj−1,0))
∥∥∥∥
∗
=
∥∥∥∥k−1∑
j=1
(σj(T0)− σj+1(T0))(Uj −Uj,0)
+ σk(T0)(Uk −Uk,0)
∥∥∥∥
∗
≤
k−1∑
j=1
(σj(T0)− σj+1(T0))‖Uj −Uj,0‖∗
+ σk(T0)‖Uk −Uk,0‖∗.
We assume 2σ1(E) ≤ σj(Σ0)− σj+1(Σ0) for all j ∈ [k], and
apply the Theorem 6 of Jiang et al. [41]. Then for j ∈ [k],
‖Uj −Uj,0‖∗ ≤min{2j, k}‖Uj −Uj,0‖2
≤min{2j, k} 2σ1(E)
σj(Σ0)− σj+1(Σ0) .
Since j ∈ [k − 1],
σj(T0)− σj+1(T0) =1− ηλ√
σj(Σ0)
−
(
1− ηλ√
σj+1(Σ0)
)
=ηλ
√
σj(Σ0)−
√
σj+1(Σ0)√
σj(Σ0)σj+1(Σ0)
,
and
σk(T0) =1− ηλ√
σk(Σ0)
≤ 1−
√
σk+1(Σ0)√
σk(Σ0)
,
therefore,∥∥∥∥ k∑
j=1
σj(T0)(uju
T
j − uj,0uTj,0)
∥∥∥∥
∗
≤
k−1∑
j=1
2ηλmin{2j, k}σ1(E)
(
√
σj(Σ0) +
√
σj+1(Σ0))
√
σj(Σ0)σj+1(Σ0)
+
2ηλkσ1(E)
(
√
σk(Σ0) +
√
σk+1(Σ0))
√
σk(Σ0)
≤
k−1∑
j=1
2ηλmin{2j, k}σ1(E)
(ηλ+ ηλ)
√
η2λ2η2λ2
+
2ηλkσ1(E)
(ηλ+ 0)ηλ
≤
(
k(k − 1)
η2λ2
+
2k
ηλ
)
σ1(E).
(57)
Combining (50), (51), (52), (53), (54), (55), (56) and (57), it
follows that
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F − ‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2F
≤2
[
k
σ1(E)
2η2λ2
+ (rc − k)I(rc > k)
√
σ1(E)
ηλ
+
(
k(k − 1)
η2λ2
+
2k
ηλ
)
σ1(E)
]
σ21(C).
(58)
On the other hand,
‖Ŵ(t)‖∗ − ‖Ŵ(t)0 ‖∗ ≤ ‖Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ‖∗.
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As such, we have
1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖∗
−
{
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖∗
}
=
1
2η
(‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F − ‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2F )
+ λ(‖Ŵ(t)‖∗ − ‖Ŵ(t)0 ‖∗)
≤
(
σ21(C)
η
+ λσ1(C)
)[
k
σ1(E)
2η2λ2
+ (rc − k)I(rc > k)
√
σ1(E)
ηλ
+
(
k(k − 1)
η2λ2
+
2k
ηλ
)
σ1(E)
]
=
1
η
(
σ21(C)
ηλ
+ σ1(C)
)[
k
σ1(E)
2ηλ
+ max(0, rc − k)
√
σ1(E) +
(
k(k − 1)
ηλ
+ 2k
)
σ1(E)
]
.
(59)
G.6 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. In the t-th step, a standard proximal operator (see Liu
et al. [49]) optimizes the following problem:
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖2,1,
where C = W˜(t−1)i . By Theorem 5 of Liu et al. [49], denote
the solution of the problem by Ŵ(t)0 = Sηλ,0C. Let Λ0 be a
diagonal matrix containing the diagonal elements of CCT, and
let S0 be a diagonal matrix and suffices Sii,0 =
√
Λii,0 for i =
1, . . . ,min{d,m}. Sηλ,0 is also a diagonal matrix and Sηλ,ii,0 =
max{0, 1− ηλ/Sii,0} for i = 1, . . . ,min{d,m}.
By Algorithm 2, Ŵ(t) = USηλUTC.
Then we analyse the bound of 1
2η
‖Ŵ(t)−C‖2F +λ‖Ŵ(t)‖2,1
− { 1
2η
‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)0 ‖2,1}.
First, similarly as in (50), we have
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F − ‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2F
=tr((Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 )(Ŵ(t) −C)T)
+ tr((Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 )(Ŵ(t)0 −C)T)
=
d∑
j=1
(Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 )j((Ŵ(t) −C)j)T
+
d∑
j=1
(Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 )j((Ŵ(t)0 −C)j)T
≤‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2,1‖Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ‖2,1
+ ‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2,1‖Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ‖2,1,
(60)
where (·)j denotes the j-th row vector of the enclosed matrix.
Denote T = Sηλ,T0 = Sηλ,0. Denote the indices of non-
zero rows of C by Ic = {j : Cj 6= 0} and let rc,s = |Ic| ≤ d.
We have
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2,1 = ‖(T− I)C‖2,1
=
d∑
j=1
√√√√ m∑
i=1
|(T− I)jCi|2 =
∑
j∈Ic
√√√√ m∑
i=1
|(T− I)jjCij |2
=
∑
j∈Ic
√√√√ m∑
i=1
|(T− I)jj |2|Cij |2 =
∑
j∈Ic
|(T− I)jj |‖Cj‖2.
Since Sηλ − I is a diagonal matrix, whose i-th diagonal
element is max{0, 1− ηλ/Sii} − 1 ∈ [−1, 0), so
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2,1 ≤
∑
j∈Ic
‖Cj‖2 ≤ rc,s max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2. (61)
Similarly,
‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2,1 ≤
∑
j∈Ic
‖Cj‖2 ≤ rc,s max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2. (62)
On the other hand,
‖Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ‖2,1 = ‖SηλC− Sηλ,0C‖2,1
=
∑
j∈Ic
|Sηλ,jj − Sηλ,jj,0|‖Cj‖2
≤ max
j′∈[d]
‖Cj′‖2
∑
j∈Ic
|Sηλ,jj − Sηλ,jj,0|.
(63)
Denote Σ0 = Σ˜
(t)
= CCT. Then we have for j ∈ Ic,
|Sηλ,jj − Sηλ,jj,0|
=
∣∣∣∣max(0, 1− ηλ√|Σjj,0 + Ejj |
)
−max
(
0, 1− ηλ√|Σjj,0|
)∣∣∣∣.
Case 1: ηλ >
√
Σjj,0. Then
|Sηλ,jj − Sηλ,jj,0|
= max
(
0, 1− ηλ√|Σjj,0 + Ejj |
)
≤ 1− ηλ√
η2λ2 + |Ejj |
≤1− ηλ
ηλ+
√|Ejj | =
√|Ejj |
ηλ+
√|Ejj | ≤
√|Ejj |
ηλ
Case 2: ηλ ≤√Σjj,0. Then
|Sηλ,jj − Sηλ,jj,0|
≤1− ηλ√|Σjj,0|+ |Ejj | − 1 + ηλ√|Σjj,0|
=ηλ ·
√|Σjj,0|+ |Ejj | −√|Σjj,0|√|Σjj,0|(|Σjj,0|+ |Ejj |)
=
ηλ|Ejj |
[
√|Σjj,0|+ |Ejj |+√|Σjj,0|]√|Σjj,0|2 + |Ejj ||Σjj,0|
≤ ηλ|Ejj |
[
√
η2λ2 + 0 +
√
η2λ2]
√
η4λ4 + 0
=
|Ejj |
2η2λ2
.
Suppose that there exists an integer k ≤ d such that
d∑
j=1
I(
√
Σjj,0 ≥ ηλ) = k
then k ≤ rc,s and∑
j∈Ic
|Sηλ,jj − Sηλ,jj,0|
≤ k
2η2λ2
max
j:η2λ2≤Σjj,0
Ejj
+
(rc,s − k)I(rc,s > k)
ηλ
max
j:η2λ2>Σjj,0
√
Ejj .
(64)
Combining (60), (61), (62), (63) and (64), it follows that
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F − ‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2F
≤2rc,s
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)2(
k
2η2λ2
max
j:η2λ2≤Σjj,0
|Ejj |
+
(rc,s − k)I(rc,s > k)
ηλ
max
j:η2λ2>Σjj,0
√
|Ejj |
)
.
(65)
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On the other hand,
‖Ŵ(t)‖2,1 − ‖Ŵ(t)0 ‖2,1 ≤ ‖Ŵ(t) − Ŵ(t)0 ‖2,1.
As such, we have
1
2η
‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F + λ‖Ŵ(t)‖2,1
−
{
min
W
1
2η
‖W −C‖2F + λ‖W‖2,1
}
=
1
2η
(‖Ŵ(t) −C‖2F − ‖Ŵ(t)0 −C‖2F )
+ λ(‖Ŵ(t)‖2,1 − ‖Ŵ(t)0 ‖2,1)
≤
[
rc,s
η
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)2
+ λ
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)]
·
[
k
2η2λ2
max
j:η2λ2≤Σjj,0
|Ejj |
+
(rc,s − k)I(rc,s > k)
ηλ
max
j:η2λ2>Σjj,0
√
|Ejj |
]
=
1
η
[
rc,s
ηλ
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)2
+
(
max
j∈[d]
‖Cj‖2
)]
·
[
k
2ηλ
max
j:η2λ2≤Σjj,0
|Ejj |
+ max(0, rc,s − k) max
j:η2λ2>Σjj,0
√
|Ejj |
]
.
(66)
G.7 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. First, consider the case with no acceleration. We first use
Proposition 1 of Schmidt et al. [60] by regarding procedures
from Step 4 to Step 9 as approximation for the proximal
operator in (7). Note that the norm clipping only bounds the
parameter space and does not affect the results of Schmidt et al.
[60]. Then for εt defined in Lemma 6 for t ∈ [T ], we have
E = 2L
m(T + 1)2
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F
+ 2
T∑
t=1
t
√
2εt
L
+
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
t2
εt
L
)2
.
Meanwhile, by Lemma 6, we have
εt = O
(
κ
t
)
,
where κ = K
3√mkd log d
η
.
On the other hand, because
 =
T∑
t=1
(et − 1)t
(et + 1)
+
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22t log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
t
δ
)
,
then by Lemma 9, we have√√√√ T∑
t=1
2t ≥
√
2
2
√
log(e+ /
√
2δ) + 2
= c2.
Then by Lemma 10, we have
T∑
t=1
√
εt =

O
(√
κTα+1/2
c2(α/2−1)2
√
2α+1
)
, α > 2;
O
(√
κT5/2
c2(α/2−1)2
√
2α+1
)
, −1/2 < α < 2;
O
(√
κT2−α
c2(α/2−1)2
√−2α−1
)
, α < −1/2.
Because W˜(0) is the result of the norm clipping, we have
W˜(0) ∈ W .
Finally, taking c3 = φ(α) defined in (12) and c4 =
κ
c2(α/2−1)2
√
|2α+1| , under the assumption that W∗ ∈ W , using
Lemma 12, we have the results for the case with no acceleration.
For the accelerated case, we use Proposition 2 of Schmidt
et al. [60] to have
E = 2L
m(T + 1)2
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F
+ 2
T∑
t=1
t
√
2εt
L
+
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
t2
εt
L
)2
.
Then one can prove similarly combining Lemma 6, Lemma 9,
Lemma 10 and Lemma 13.
G.8 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. First, consider the case with no acceleration. We use
Proposition 1 of Schmidt et al. [60] and prove similarly as in
Appendix G.7, combining Lemma 7, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and
Lemma 12.
For the accelerated case, we use Proposition 2 of Schmidt
et al. [60] and prove similarly as in Appendix G.7, combining
Lemma 7, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 13.
G.9 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. First, consider the case with no acceleration. We use
Proposition 3 of Schmidt et al. [60] to have
E = Q
T
0√
m
(
‖W˜(0) −W∗‖F + 2
T∑
t=1
Q−t0
√
2εt
L
)
.
Then one can prove similarly as in Appendix G.7, combining
Lemma 6, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 14.
For the accelerated case, we use Proposition 4 of Schmidt
et al. [60] to have
E =(Q0)
T
m
(√
2(f(Ŵ(0))− f(W∗)) + 2
√
L
µ
T∑
t=1
√
εt(Q0)−t
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
εt(Q0)−t
)2
.
Then one can prove similarly as in Appendix G.7, using the
assumption that f(W˜(0)) − f(W∗) = O(K2Lm), combining
Lemma 6, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 15.
G.10 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. First, consider the case with no acceleration. We use
Proposition 3 of Schmidt et al. [60] and prove similarly as in
Appendix G.9, combining Lemma 7, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and
Lemma 14.
For the accelerated case, we use Proposition 4 of Schmidt
et al. [60] and prove similarly as in Appendix G.9, using the
assumption that f(W˜(0)) − f(W∗) = O(K2Lm), combining
Lemma 7, Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 15.
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G.11 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Consider the bound in (11), whose logarithm is
φ(α) log
(Kkd log d√log(e+ /√2δ) + 2
√
m
)
− φ(α) log((α/2− 1)2
√
|2α+ 1|) + log(K2L)
By Assumption 1, the first term dominates. Then we should
firstly maximize φ(α), which results in that φ(α) = 2/5 and
−1/2 < α < 2. Then since φ(α) is now fixed, we maximize
(α/2 − 1)2√|2α+ 1|, which results in α = 0. Results under
other settings can be proved similarly.
G.12 Proof of Claim 2
Proof. First, consider the convex case. Taking Theorem 2 as
an example. It is similar for Theorem 3 Denote by T0 and T1
the runtimes for the no-acceleration and acceleration strategies,
respectively.
By Theorem 6, T0 = Θ((1/M)2/5) and T1 =
Θ(((8/5)2/M)2/9). Then we have log T0 = Θ(−(2/5) logM)
and log T1 = Θ((4/9) log(8/5)− (2/9) logM).
Under Assumption 1, M  1. Then the terms with
(− logM) dominate, respectively. Therefore, we have log T1 <
log T0 → T1 < T0.
Next, consider the convex case. Taking Theorem 4 as an
example. It is similar for Theorem 5.
Denote by T ′0 and T ′1 the runtimes for the no-acceleration
and acceleration strategies, respectively.
By Theorem 6, we have
T ′0 = Θ(log1/Q20((Q
4/5
0 − 1)2/M))
= Θ
(
1
log(1/Q20)
(2 log(Q
4/5
0 − 1)− logM)
)
T ′1 = Θ(log1/Q′0(((Q
′
0)
2/5 − 1)2/M))
= Θ
(
1
log(1/Q′0)
(2 log((Q′0)
2/5 − 1)− logM)
)
Since Q′0 = 1−
√
µ/L and Q0 = 1− µ/L, assuming µ/L <
0.3819, we have Q20 = (1−µ/L)2 > 1−
√
µ/L = Q′0. Therefore,
1/ log(1/Q20) > 1/ log(1/Q
′
0).
Under Assumption 1, M  1. Then the terms with
(− logM) dominate, respectively. Therefore, we have T ′1 <
T ′0.
G.13 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First, consider the method of Pathak et al. [58].
By Definition 8, an (, δ)-IP-MTL algorithm with T = 1
should suffice for any set S ⊆ Rd×(m−1) and all i ∈ [m] that
P(wˆ(1)[−i] ∈ S |W(0),Dm)
≤eP(wˆ(1)[−i] ∈ S | (W′)(0), (D′)m) + δ.
On the other hand, for the  given in the method of Pathak
et al. [58], using Theorem 4.1 of Pathak et al. [58], taking D =
Dm and D′ = (D′)m, we have for any set S ⊆ Rd,
P(wˆs ∈ S | Dm) ≤ eP(wˆs ∈ S | (D′)m),
where wˆs is defined in Section 3.2 of Pathak et al. [58].
Because the method of Pathak et al. [58] uses wˆs for all the
tasks, then we have wˆ(1)i = wˆ
s for all i ∈ [m].
As such, denote W(0) and (W′)(0) as the collections of
models independently learned using Dm and (D′)m, respec-
tively. Then Dm and (D′)m contain all the information of
W(0) and (W′)(0), respectively. As such, we have for any set
S ⊆ Rd×(m−1), all i ∈ [m] and δ = 0 that
P(wˆ(1)[−i] ∈ S |W(0),Dm)
≤eP(wˆ(1)[−i] ∈ S | (W′)(0), (D′)m) + δ,
which shows that the method of Pathak et al. [58] is an (, δ)-
IP-MTL algorithm with T = 1 and δ = 0.
Then we consider the method of Gupta et al. [34]. Assume
a constant δ ≥ 0 and the number of iteration T is given.
Taking T0 = m, t = i for i ∈ [m], βt = wˆi, D = Dm, for
the  given in the method of Gupta et al. [34], using Theorem 1
of Gupta et al. [34], for t ∈ [T ], we have in the t-th each iteration,
for any set S ⊆ Rd×m and all i ∈ [m],
P(Wˆ(t) ∈ S | Dm) ≤ eP(Wˆ(t) ∈ S | (D′)m),
which suggests that for any set S ⊆ Rd×(m−1) and all i ∈ [m],
P(wˆ(t)[−i] ∈ S | Dm) ≤ eP(wˆ(t)[−i] ∈ S | (D′)m).
Then for all i ∈ [m] and for all t ∈ [T ], take the t-th output
θt,i = wˆ
(t)
[−i] and δt = 0.
Therefore by the Adaptive composition property (Property 4),
for all i ∈ [m] and for any set S ⊂ Rd×(m−1)×T ,
P((θ1,i, . . . , θT,i) ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (Dm,θ1:t−1)))
≤e˜P((θ1,i, · · · , θT,i) ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = ((D′)m,θ1:t−1)))
+ δ,
where for all t ∈ [T ], Bt denotes the input for the t-th iteration,
θ1:t−1 =
{ ∅, t = 1
(θ1,1, . . . , θ1,m) . . . , (θt−1,1, . . . , θt−1,m), t ≥ 2,
and ˜ is defined as follows.
˜ = min
{ T∑
t=1
,
T∑
t=1
(e − 1)
(e + 1)
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
22 log
(
1
δ
)
,
T∑
t=1
(e − 1)
(e + 1)
+
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
22 log
(
e+
√∑T
t=1 
2
δ
)}
.
As such, in each t-th iteration, denote W(t−1) and (W′)(t−1)
as the collections of models independently learned using
(Dm,θ1:t−1) and (D′)m,θ1:t−1), respectively. Then (Dm,θ1:t−1)
and (D′)m,θ1:t−1) contain all the information of W(t−1) and
(W′)(t−1), respectively.
Therefore, we have for any set S ⊂ Rd×(m−1)×T ,
P(w(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = (W(t−1),Dm,θ1:t−1)))
≤e˜P(w(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
(Bt = ((W′)(t−1), (D′)m,θ1:t−1)))
+ δ,
which shows that by Definition 8, the method of Gupta et al.
[34] is an (˜, δ)-IP-MTL algorithm.
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G.14 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Given an (, δ) - IP-MTL algorithm A(B), by Definition
8, we have for any set S ⊆ Rd×(m−1)×T that
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1),Dm,θ1:t−1))
≤ exp()P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = ((W′)(t−1), (D′)m,θ1:t−1))
+ δ.
Furthermore, following the proof of the Group privacy prop-
erty (Property 2), shown by Vadhan [67], for protecting the
entire dataset, n data instances, of the i-th task, we con-
struct a series of datasets, Dm(0),Dm(1), . . . ,Dm(n), and let Dm(0) =
Dm,Dm(n) = (D′)m such that for j = 0, . . . , n − 1, Dm(j) and
Dm(j+1) are two neighboring datasets that differ in one data
instance. Let a series of model matrices, W(0), . . . ,W(n), where
W(0) = W,W(n) = W
′, be the input model matrices in those
settings. Let a series of output objects θ(0)1:t−1, . . . ,θ
(n)
1:t−1, where
θ
(0)
1:t−1 = θ1:t−1,θ
(n)
1:t−1 = W
′, be the output objects in those
settings.
Then, we have
P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1)(0) ,Dm(0),θ(0)1:t−1))
≤ exp()P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1)(1) ,Dm(1),θ(1)1:t−1))
+ δ
...
≤ exp(n)P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1)(n) ,Dm(n),θ(n)1:t−1))
+ (1 + exp() + . . .+ exp((n− 1)))δ
≤ exp(n)P(wˆ(1:T )[−i] ∈ S |
T⋂
t=1
Bt = (W(t−1)(n) ,Dm(n),θ(n)1:t−1))
+ n exp(n)δ,
which renders A as an (n, n exp(n)δ) - MP-MTL algorithm.
